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This paper uses the co-incidence of extreme shocks to banks’ risk to examine within country and across
country contagion among large EU banks. Banks’ risk is measured by the first difference of weekly
distances to default and abnormal returns. Using Monte Carlo simulations, the paper examines whether the
observed frequency of large shocks experienced by two or more banks simultaneously is consistent with
the assumption of a multivariate normal or a student t distribution. Further, the paper proposes a simple
metric, which is used to identify contagion from one bank to another and identify “systemically
important” banks in the EU.
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There is a very active debate on the use of market data in the supervision of banks. This paper proposes
to use market data, especially the distance to default, to examine bank contagion. The paper builds
upon the approach taken in a recent paper by Bae et al. (2003), who considered contagion among stock
market returns in emerging markets. The approach is related to the growing conviction that the
behaviour of tail observations for financial market data is quite different from the behaviour of other
observations (extreme value theory). In this sense, the paper attempts to make a contribution to both the
bank contagion and market discipline literatures.
We empirically examine contagion in a sample of 67 EU banks. The banks in the sample are those EU
banks, for which we were able to obtain sufficiently long and liquid data series on stock market returns.
For these banks we analyse the weekly first difference of the distance to default (and weekly abnormal
stock returns). In a recent paper (Gropp et al., 2003), it was shown that the distance to default may be a
particularly suitable way to measure bank risk, avoiding problems of other measures, such as
subordinated debt spreads. The distance to default combines information on stock price returns with
asset volatility and leverage and represents the number of standard deviations away from the default
point. The default point is defined as the point at which the liabilities of the bank are just equal to the
assets.
We define contagion as one bank being hit by an idiosyncratic shock, which is transmitted to other
banks. We will not specify the channel of transmission, but one could imagine money markets,
payment systems, equity (ownership) links and “pure” contagion. The paper has two parts. In the first
part, we test whether observed patterns in the data are consistent with standard distributional
assumptions. In order to do this, we us a concept called “co-exceedance.” A co-exceedance is a period
(in this paper: a week) during which two or more banks first difference in the distance to default was in
the 5
th percentile positive or negative tail. We then test whether the observed co-exceedances are
consistent with a multivariate normal distribution or a Student t distribution under different
assumptions about its kurtosis. These tests are carried out by using Monte Carlo simulations: Based on
the observed variance/covariance matrix we generate co-exceedances based on multivariate normality
or student t distributional assumptions and compare the patterns of co-exceedances to those generated
by the actual data.
We find that within countries and across countries, multivariate normality can be rejected in all cases.
A student t distribution may be consistent with the observed patterns in some cases, but generally we
cannot replicate the co-exceedences either under multivariate normality or student t assumptions. The
same result is found for simulations across country pairs. This implies that there are non-linearities in
the tails of the distribution. In particular, it would suggest that the distribution of the first difference in
the distance to default of each individual bank not only exhibits fat tails (a common phenomenon in
asset prices), but that the probability of one bank being in the tail is conditional on other banks being in
ECB • Working Paper No 297 • December 2003 5the tail. Economically, this either means that large common shocks are more highly correlated across
banks than small common shocks or that idiosyncratic shocks affecting one bank are transmitted to
other banks (contagion).
We argue that an appropriate way to address this finding and distinguish common shocks affecting two
or more banks from contagion may be a non-parametric approach. This is done in the second part of the
paper. We present a simple measure of what we label “net-contagious influence.” The measure
represents the difference in the conditional probabilities of being in the tail between two banks adjusted
for differences in the probabilities of being hit by an idiosyncratic shock. We show that this measure
should give an accurate indication of contagious influence between two banks.
Using this method we identify banks, which appear to have been of systemic importance within
individual countries and across countries. Overall, the results suggest that there may be relatively few
banks with EU-wide systemic importance. The banks consistently identified as systemically important
in the EU are Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Danske Bank, Allied Irish Bank, Bank of Ireland, ING,
ABN Amro, HSBC and National Westminster Bank. BNP Paribas, Natexis, BBVA, Banco Santander
and a number of large UK banks seem to have some systemic importance, but the evidence is weaker.
Finally, the methodology lends itself to identify the strength of the links among banking systems in the
EU. This analysis has a number of interesting conclusions: One, the UK and other non-euro countries
seem to be no less integrated (by our measure of contagious influence) with euro area countries than
euro area countries with each other. Second, there may be significant contagious influence emanating
from the banking systems of some of the smaller countries, such as Denmark and Ireland, which may
be a reflection of significant exposures of foreign banks in these countries.
The paper has implications for the ongoing debate on how to use market information for supervisory
purposes and for monitoring financial stability. In particular, it suggests that a further use of market
data, beyond predicting individual bank failures, may be to measure contagion and, ultimately,
systemic risk. Market information may also give information on banks, which have systemic
importance, and therefor may deserve particular attention from supervisors and central banks. It is also
of relevance to a better understanding of the extent to which European banking systems have become
interconnected and how banking problems could spread across borders.
ECB • Working Paper No 297 • December 2003 61. Introduction
This paper proposes a new methodology, which we believe may be able to identify the direction of
contagion from one bank to another, given a relatively non-restrictive set of assumptions about the shocks
affecting banks. The paper builds upon the approach taken in a recent paper by Bae et al. (2003), who
considered contagion among stock market returns in emerging markets. The approach is related to the
growing conviction that the behaviour of tail observations for financial market data is quite different from
the behaviour of other observations (extreme value theory).
The previous empirical literature on bank contagion has largely employed three distinct approaches:
autocorrelation tests, survival time tests and event studies. Along the lines of the first approach, a number
of papers has tested for autocorrelation in bank failures, controlling for macroeconomic conditions
(Grossman, 1993; Hasan and Dwyer, 1994; Schoenmaker, 1996). A positive and significant
autocorrelation coefficient indicates that bank failures cluster over time, given that all macroeconomic
factors have been appropriately controlled for. All authors find evidence in favour of contagion, although
the approach suffers from a number of inherent disadvantages. In particular, omitted macro variables,
which exhibit autocorrelation would bias the results, the approach is limited by the frequency of the
availability of macroeconomic data and third, the implications of the papers for today’s banking system
may be limited, as all papers have examined contagion in historical periods, in order to avoid problems
associated with public safety nets (such as deposit insurance, lender of last resort).
1
More recently, Calomiris and Mason (2000) examine the question whether fundamentals can explain the
survival time of banks during the great depression. They find that micro, regional and national
fundamentals indeed can explain a large portion of the probability of survival of banks during the great
depression. There is some evidence of contagion, although it appears to have been limited to specific
regions of the US.
Somewhat more closely related to the approach taken in this paper is the quite extensive literature
examining the reaction of stock prices to news (for a survey see De Bandt and Hartmann, 2001). Overall,
the literature suggests that stock price reactions to news vary proportionally to the degree of the news’
extent of affecting the bank. Hence, the results tend to be consistent with “information based” contagion,
rather than “pure” contagion. Overall, the evidence, however, is limited to the US banking system (an
exception is Gay et al. (1991) which examine data for Hong Kong) and the approach is not well suited to
distinguishing macro shocks affecting all banks simultaneously and “proper” contagion as defined above.
Further, as for example Gropp et al. (2002) argue, the measure employed in these papers, namely
cumulative abnormal stock market returns may not be well suited to measure certain types of shocks, such
as increases in earnings volatility or leverage. In order to avoid these problems, in this paper we consider
the distance to default, which combines information on leverage, asset volatility with information
contained in stock returns, in addition to using abnormal returns.
                                                     
1  Grossman (1993) looks at US data for 1875-1914, Hasan and Dwyer (1994) consider the US free banking era
(1837-1863) and Shoemaker (1996) the years 1880-1936, also in the US.
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the empirical literature on financial market contagion and extreme value theory. Financial market
contagion (equity markets, foreign exchanges markets and, to a more limited extent, bond markets) up
until fairly recently was largely examined by testing whether the correlation between two markets
increased in crisis periods (e.g. Bennett and Kelleher, 1988; King and Wadhwani, 1990; Wolf, 2000).
However, Boyer et al. (1997) point out that observed increases in asset price correlations during crisis
periods may simply be a statistical artefact. They show that for any bivariate normal return distribution,
the correlation coefficient of the two marginal distributions conditional on the marginal distributions’
standard deviations increases with the conditioning standard deviation. Hence, dividing a sample into
crisis periods, which by definition tend to exhibit higher volatilities, and tranquil periods, which show
lower volatility, will statistically result in a higher measured correlation during crisis periods, which,
however, is not a reflection of contagion. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) correct for the problem and
conclude that contagion during the 1987 stock market, the 1994 Mexican and the 1997 Asian crises have
been significantly overstated. Virtually all of the observed patterns can be explained by the markets’ usual
interdependence. Recently Forbes and Rigobon (2002) approach has been criticised as regards to its lack
of robustness with respect to omitted variable bias (Corsetti et al., 2002), as well as its choice of time
window (Billio et al., 2002). Following this criticism, Ciccarelli and Rebucci (2003) present a Bayesian
time-varying coefficient model and show that it provides improvements in the (joint) presence of
heteroskedasticity and omitted variables.
Another avenue of research has been the application of extreme value theory, which concentrates on
extreme co-movements, rather than examining statistical interdependence for the entire distribution.
Examining interdependencies in the tails of the distribution, permits the examination of non-linearities in
co-movements, as well as a relaxation of the assumption of multivariate normality of returns, which in
case of fat-tailed financial market data tend to be violated (De Bandt and Hartmann, 2001; Straetmans,
2000). Hartmann et al. (2003) apply non-parametric extreme dependency measures to study extreme co-
movements between stock, bond and money markets across G5 countries. They find that while the
probability of a crash of the size as experienced in 1987 in the US is extremely low, the conditional
probability of having a stock market crash of the size of 1987 in a G5 country, given a crash of this size in
another G5 country, is significantly higher. In addition, the paper shows that the tails of the distribution
exhibit substantial non-linearities relative to the entire distribution of returns. Longin and Solnik (2001)
apply extreme value theory to monthly G5 equity returns between 1958 and 1996, assuming a logistic
distribution function. They reject normality in the left tail (crashes), but not in the right tail (booms).
2
In this paper we examine contagion in a sample of 67 EU banks. For these banks we analyse the weekly
first difference of the distance to default (and weekly abnormal stock returns). We define contagion as one
bank being hit by an idiosyncratic shock, which is transmitted to other banks. We will not specify the
                                                     
2  Another strand of literature has advocated the use of GARCH models (Hamao et al., 1990; Lin et al., 1994;
Susmel and Engle, 1994). Ramchand and Susmel (1998) extent the approach such that high variance and low
variance states are no longer required to be drawn from the same distribution. Hence, they estimate a bivariate
switching ARCH model, with the advantage that crisis episodes are endogenously determined by the data.
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links and “pure” contagion. The approach employed is quite closely related to Longin and Solnik (2001),
in the sense that we test whether the observed co-exceedances (i.e. the presence of two or more banks in
the tail of the distribution simultaneously) are consistent with a multivariate normal distribution. As in Bae
et al. (2003) we also examine, whether a Student t distribution under different assumptions about its
kurtosis is consistent with the observed patterns in the data. We find that within countries, multivariate
normality can be rejected in all cases. A student t distribution may be consistent with the observed patterns
in some countries but generally we cannot replicate the co-exceedences either under multivariate
normality or student t assumptions. The same result is found for simulations across country pairs. The
findings are strongly suggestive of non-linearities in the tails of the distribution. We argue that an
appropriate way to address this finding may be a non-parametric approach. Hence, the paper presents a
simple measure of what we label “net-contagious influence.” Using this method we identify banks, which
appear to have been of systemic importance both for individual countries and across countries. Overall,
the results suggest that there may be few banks with EU-wide systemic importance.
The paper has implications for the ongoing debate on how to use market information for supervisory
purposes and for monitoring financial stability. It is also of relevance to a better understanding of the
extent to which European banking systems have become interconnected and how banking problems could
spread across borders. The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: In the next section, the
calculation of our measure of bank risk is briefly described. In section 3, the sample and the data used in
this paper are described, section 4 discusses the approach to identifying contagion employed and presents
the main results. In section 5, we apply the methodology to identifying systemically important banks in
the EU and section 6 concludes.
2. Calculation of ln(∆dd)
We use the weekly first difference of the distance to default as our measure of bank risk. In Gropp et al.
(2002) it was argued that specifically with respect to banks, the distance to default may be a particularly
suitable and all-encompassing measure of bank risk. In particular, the measure’s ability to measure risk is
not affected by the presence of explicit or implicit safety nets (unlike e.g. subordinated debt spreads).
Further, it combines information about stock returns with leverage and volatility information,
encompassing the most important concepts of risk (unlike e.g. unadjusted stock returns). As we are
interested in the transmission of shocks from one bank to another we use the first difference of the
distance to default. We calculated the distance to default for each bank in the sample and for each time
period, t, using that period’s equity market data. The distance to default is derived based on the Black-
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3   See KMV Corporation (1999) for a similar derivation and more ample discussions.
ECB • Working Paper No 297 • December 2003 9which gives the asset value at time T (i.e. maturity of debt), given its current value (VA). ε is the random
component of the firm’s return on assets, which the Black-Scholes model assumes is normally distributed,
with zero mean and unit variance, N(0,1).
Hence, the current distance d from the default point (where  D V
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represents the number of standard deviations that the firm is from the default point. The inputs to DD, VA
and σ A, can be calculated from observable market value of equity capital, VE, volatility of equity σ E, and D
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The system of equations (4) was solved by using the generalised reduced gradient method to yield the
values for VA and σ A, which in turn entered into the calculation of the distance to default. The measure of
bank risk used in this paper is then obtained by taking ln(ddt/ddt-1 ), using the end of week distance to
default which in the following will be denoted as ln(∆dd). Hence, ln(∆dd) measures the percentage change
in the number of standard deviations away from the default point.
4
As underlying data we used monthly averages of the equity market capitalisation, VE from Datastream.
The equity volatility, σ E, was estimated as the standard deviation of the daily absolute equity returns and,
as proposed in Marcus and Shaked (1984), we took the 6-month moving average (backwards) to reduce
noise. The presumption is that the market participants do not use the very volatile short-term estimates,
but more smoothed volatility measures. This is not an efficient procedure as it imposes the volatility to be
ECB • Working Paper No 297 • December 2003 10constant. However, equity volatility is accurately estimated for a specific time interval, as long as leverage
does not change substantially over that period (see for example Bongini et al., 2002). The total debt
liabilities, VL, are obtained from published accounts and are interpolated (using a cubic spline) to yield
weekly observations. The time to the maturing of the debt, T was set to one year, which is the common
benchmark assumption without particular information about the maturity structure. Finally, we used the
government bond rates as the risk-free rates, r.
3. Sample selection and characteristics
We started with all EU banks that are listed at a stock exchange and whose stock price and total debt are
available from Datastream during January 1991 to January 2003 (92 banks). We deleted all banks that had
trading volume below one thousand stocks in more than 30% of all trading days (7 banks). Furthermore,
we deleted three additional banks where we had serious concerns about data quality
5 and 15 banks due to
data covering less than half of the entire sample period. As will be seen below, completeness of data for
each bank remaining in the sample is important, in order to avoid distortions in our measure of contagion
due to few (tail) observations. The resulting sample contains 38600 week/bank observations for 67 banks,
i.e. on average around 576 observations per bank (Table 1).
The sample contains 39 banks with maximum number of observations, given the time period considered
(628) and only three banks with less than 400 observations. The minimum number of observations is 351
(Banco di Desio e della Brianza). On average the banks in the sample are just above four standard
deviations away from the default point (a mean distance to default of 4.03). However, this hides
substantial variation in the health of banks. Banco di Napoli represents the minimum with a distance of
default dipping below zero at -0.29, suggesting that the bank was in default. No other banks exhibit
negative distances to default in the sample; Banco Espaniol de Credito (Spain), Bankgesellschaft Berlin
(Germany), Sampo Leonia (Finland), SEB (Sweden) all show distances to default below one and all are
well known to have experienced significant difficulties during the period under consideration in this paper.
At the other end of the spectrum, there were 14 banks with a maximal distance to default of above 10.
Interesting the global maximum of 17.11 is attributable to the same bank that also experienced the global
minimum: Banca di Napoli. The mean of the first difference in the distance to default is approximately
zero, the largest negative change is about –4, which given a mean level of 4 can truly be considered a
sizeable weekly shock.
The banks in the sample are generally quite large. On average, total assets amount to EUR 152 billion.
The relatively large average size is an outcome of the requirement for the bank to be traded at a stock
exchange. Nevertheless, the size variation is considerable within the sample. For example, the largest
bank, Deutsche Bank, is 300 times the size of the smallest, Banco Desio e della Brianza. Table 3 gives all
banks in the sample, ranked by total assets. The table suggests that in most countries, the largest banks are
                                                                                                                                                           
4  Below we will also show results for the absolute first difference in the distance to default, ∆dd, and abnormal
returns.
5  The banks showed zero equity return on a high number of trading days, resulting in extremely volatile distances to
default.
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be excluded due to data limitations. This results in an above 50 percent coverage of total banking assets in
the EU, despite the fact that in numbers the sample contains less than 1 percent of all EU banks (Table 2).
The degree of coverage in each country depends on the number of banks traded at a stock exchange and
the structure (especially concentration) of the banking system. The sample contains banks from all EU
countries except Luxembourg. The ranking of all banks by total assets (with the largest bank in each
country in bold) is also presented, because it permits a check of all results presented subsequently in the
paper. Clearly, the naïve approach to determining within country systemically important banks would be
to pick the largest bank(s) in each country and for the EU as a whole, the largest banks in the EU.
As a first step we calculated the full correlation matrix of ln(∆dd) for all banks in the sample.
6 As
expected, within country correlations are higher than across country correlations. For example in
Germany, BHVB correlation with Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank are around 0.7, the
correlation between Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank is 0.86. Similarly, the correlation between the
distribution of ING and ABN Amro in the Netherlands is 0.6. The correlation in ln(∆dd) among UK banks
is also high, in many cases above 0.5. However, in some cases within country correlations among banks
are much lower, i.e. in Italy where most correlations cluster around 0.2, as well as in Portugal, Sweden
and Austria. In Spain, we have some banks that show quite high correlations, especially involving BBVA ,
whose ∆dd shows a correlation of 0.6 with Banco Santander and 0.5 with Banco Popular Espanol. Most
other Spanish banks show correlations that range between just above zero and 0.2.
Again as one would expect, correlations are also generally quite low for cross-country bank pairs. Of the
4489 cross-country correlations, only around 60 (less than 2 percent) are above 0.3. High correlations
exist between German and some Spanish banks, between the largest French and Spanish banks, between
Dutch and German, as well as Dutch and Irish banks. Interestingly, some banks tend show negative
correlations with most banks in the sample. These include Banco di Napoli and Okobank, both of which
experienced substantial difficulties during the sample period.
7
As we have argued above, the study of correlations may be misleading or uninformative in a number of
respects. Correlations may not be constant during crisis times, precisely when contagion would be of
particular interest. It has been well established that the behaviour of tail observations for financial market
data is quite different from the behaviour of other observations. In addition, we are specifically interested
in distinguishing contagion, as opposed to common shocks affecting banks simultaneously. We define
contagion as one bank being hit by an idiosyncratic shock, which then is transmitted to other banks.
Correlations, by definition, will not be able to distinguish the two, unless one attempts to fully control for
common (macro) shocks. Related to this, in the case of banks in particular, the direction of contagion is of
interest, i.e. which bank may have systemic importance for other banks.
                                                     
6  The matrix is not presented due to space limitations, but is available upon request.
7  As we will see below, idiosyncratic shocks facing each bank are crucial in order to identify contagion. This issue
will be revisited below.
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distribution of ln(∆dd). We count the number of times at least one bank’s ln(∆dd) is in the tail of the
distribution (“exceedance”) and, more importantly, the number of times more than one bank is in the tail
of the distribution (“co-exceedance”). We arbitrarily define a tail event as one in the 5 percent (positive
and negative) tail of the distribution.
8 Figure 1 shows the number of tail events per week: panel A shows
the histogram of both tails simultaneously, while panel B and panel C represent the number of tail events
in the positive and negative tail respectively. The histograms show that the tail events are not evenly
spread over the sample period. The maximum number of co-exceedences is reached in the first week of
November 1997, when 49 (out of 67) banks have a big (negative) change in their distance to default.
In table 4 we report the counts of the number of co-exceedances within countries. For the within country
exercise to be meaningful, we were limited to countries with at least three banks. Hence, no figures are
provided for banks in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece and Sweden.
9
For the following, we also limit the sample to banks for which we have at least 500 concurrent
observations; this is necessary for the simulations reported below.
10 Let us examine co-exceedances within
countries first. The maximum number of co-exceedances is naturally constrained by the number of banks
for which we have observations. From this perspective, Germany, Italy, and the UK are the most
interesting countries, as we have 8, 10 and 7 banks in the sample, respectively. Considering only these
three countries, one is immediately struck by the fact that Germany and Italy have 6 and 8 weeks, during
which 5 or more banks were in the bottom tail and 4 and 7 weeks, respectively, in which 5 or more banks
were in the top tail. In contrast, the corresponding figures for Spain are 2 and 2 weeks. Recall that the
correlations among banks of ln(∆dd) considering the entire distribution were higher in Germany and Spain
compared to the Italy.. Next, consider the three countries with three banks (France, Ireland and the
Netherlands) together with Portugal, which has 4 banks in the sample. Ireland and Portugal have
substantially more weeks, in which all three (or more, in case of Portugal) banks were in the bottom tail
compared to the other two countries. Furthermore, there are considerable asymmetries with respect to
bottom and top tail co-exceedances. In Ireland, for example, there are seven weeks, in which all three Irish
banks experienced a bottom tail event, but only four weeks in which all three banks had a top tail event.
Also, in the UK bottom tail co-exceedances are more frequent than top tail co-exceedances, as there is
only one week with five banks co-exceeding in the top tail, but six such cases in the bottom tail.
We are also interested in cross-border contagion. Hence, we performed the same exercise of counting co-
exceedances for bilateral country pairs of the largest EU countries (Germany, Spain, France, Italy and the
UK). The results are reported in Table 5. For ease of presentation, we report co-exceedances if at least one
bank from each country is in the tail in a given week. Hence, the category “5 co-exceedances” for the UK-
FR country pair contains at least one bank each from the UK and France, but we do not distinguish
between whether there are four French banks and one UK bank or four UK banks and one French bank.
Overall, there are a substantial number of weeks with more than five banks concurrently in the tail.
                                                     
8  We check a 10 percent threshold below.
9  Note that the banks in these countries will, however, be considered when we examine systematically important
banks below.
10  The requirement will be relaxed in Section IV.2. of the paper.
ECB • Working Paper No 297 • December 2003 13Excluding the country pairs with France, which given the low number of French banks in the sample are
not strictly comparable, this figure varies from 6 (Spain-UK) to 16 (Germany-Spain) for the bottom tails
and from 7 (Spain-UK) to 20 (Spain-Italy) for the positive tails. For the country pairs involving France,
five or more banks are in the bottom tail 5-7 weeks, in the top tail 3 to 9 weeks. This high variation in
itself may suggest that there are differences across country pairs, although clearly this may be due to
common shocks hitting banks in the two countries simultaneously as much as to contagion. Looking
across the table, one also notices that in some cases the frequency of bottom tail co-exceedances appears
to be quite different from the one in the top tail, although no strong patterns emerge.
In summary, both the relatively high number of co-exceedances and the asymmetry in bottom and top tail
co-exceedances are suggestive that the correlation among banks may not be constant during “extreme”
times. In the following, we compare the observed co-exceedances with those generated by Monte Carlo
simulations under standard distributional assumptions.
4. Identification of contagion
4.1.  Co-exceedances and Monte Carlo evidence
Suppose that the variance/covariance matrix of ln(∆dd) is stationary over the sample period and that the
returns follow a multivariate Normal or Student t distribution. Using that variance-covariance matrix, we
simulate 1000 random realisations of the time series of weekly realisations of ln(∆dd). In order to limit
computations, rather than simulate the joint distribution of all 67 banks, we simulated country by country
as a first step. For each realization, we identify the 5 percent tail for the bottom tail and the top tail
separately and perform a non-parametric count across banks within countries. This process yields a set of
simulated exceedences (one bank in the tail) and co-exceedances (two or more banks in the tail), which we
can compare to the number of exceedances and co-exceedances in the actual data.
The distribution of the co-exceedances will depend on the assumptions made about the data generating
process. We perform Monte Carlo simulations under three assumptions: The data have been generated by
a multivariate normal distribution, by a student t distribution with 5 degrees of freedom or by a student t
distribution with 10 degrees of freedom.
11 The results of this exercise are reported in Table 6 for each
country separately. We, as before, limited ourselves to countries with three or more banks. We find that
the multivariate Normal distribution is unable to replicate the number of co-exceedances in the actual data
for any of the banks in the countries we study, regardless of whether we consider positive or negative co-
exceedances. Even more striking, in some countries, the student t distribution with 5 degrees of freedom,
                                                     
11  The degrees of freedom in a student t distribution equal N+K-1, where N is the number of banks (8 for Germany,
7 for Spain, 3 for France, 3 for Ireland, 10 for Italy, 3 for the Netherlands, 4 for Portugal and 7 for the UK) and where
K can be set from 1 (significant positive excess kurtosis) to 25 (little excess kurtosis, approximating Normal). We also
explored scenarios with lower values for K, but found them to vastly understate the number of cases with co-
exceedances of less than 3 banks. Bae et al. (2003) report also scenario’s using a multivariate GARCH approach, but
find that it also is unable to generate the number of co-exceedances in their sample of emerging market stock returns.
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the data or if it is, is unable to replicate the number of single exceedances.
Let us consider the countries with at least 7 banks first. The multivariate Normal distribution generates
zero weeks with five or more co-exceedances for Spain, the UK, and Italy for both tails, while the actual
figures are 2, 6 and 8 weeks for the bottom tail and 2, 1 and 7 weeks for the top tail, respectively. In
Germany the Normal distribution, due to the higher correlations among banks, generates 3 weeks with five
or more co-exceedances in both tails, which compares to 6 (4) weeks for bottom (top) tails in the data. In
general, in the case of Germany, the Normal distribution comes closest of all countries to replicating the
actual data. In Ireland, France, and the Netherlands, there are only three banks in the sample. The Normal
distribution generates 1.7, 0.9 and 1.1 weeks, respectively, in which all of these banks are simulated to be
in the bottom tail. This compares to 7, 2 and 3 weeks in the data. The figures for the top tails look quite
similar.
The student t distribution yields simulation results closer to the actual data. For example, the German and
Spanish co-exceedances for both tails can largely be replicated assuming a student t distribution with 10
degrees of freedom. In countries with 3 or 4 banks, we find that the student t distribution with 5 degrees of
freedom is able to replicate the results for both tails in France and Portugal and for bottom tails in the
Netherlands and the top tails in Ireland. Nevertheless, the results overall suggest that in most countries it is
exceedingly difficult to replicate the distribution of co-exceedances. Looking at the 95 percent confidence
bands of the simulated distributions, we can reject equality for all countries at least for some level of co-
exceedance for the Normal distribution and for many in case of the student t distributions.
We wanted to check whether this result would extend to other measures of bank risk. We report the results
for the first differenced distance to default in Table 6a. Conceptually, the simple first difference in the
distance to default reflects shocks, which are large in absolute terms. This has the consequence, however,
that banks, which are already close to the default point, by construction, cannot experience a tail event, as
the distribution of the level distance to default is truncated at zero. The log-differenced distance to default
highlights percentage changes, which avoids the problem of truncation. However, to the extent that our
measure is noisy, for banks close to the default point we may be interpreting noise as tail events.
Table 6a is organised exactly as Table 6 above. Comparing the two tables it turns out that the results are
very similar. As before, a multivariate normal distribution is not able to replicate our counts of co-
exceedances. The fatter-tailed student t-distribution does a better job in this respect. For example, both
measures suggest equal frequencies of weeks in which at least five banks were concurrently in the tail (in
countries with at least 5 banks). More formally, we examined whether applying the first-differenced
simulation results to the log-differenced actual co-exceedances would have resulted in more or less
rejections of the simulated co-exceedances. We found this not to be the case, the only exception being the
UK in the case of negative tail co-exceedances. In addition, we checked whether the measures pick up the
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same. Again we found this to be the case.
12
For the second robustness check we use abnormal returns, which we obtained by using the residuals from
the following standard one factor model:
t ct it M R 1 1 0 ε α α + + = (5)
where Rit denotes the log weekly return of bank i in week t and Mct denotes the weekly log return of the
broad market index of the country c, where bank i is headquartered. The estimated residuals  t 1 ˆ ε are then
the abnormal returns of bank i. Results from estimating equation (5) are given in Appendix A. The
estimated coefficient on α1 (“beta”) is of particular interest. On average, it is 0.89, with a maximum of
1.58 (Standard Chartered) and a minimum of 0.22 (Banco Guipuzcoano). In all cases, the coefficient is
significant at the one percent level. On average, the market portfolio explains around a third of the total
variation in log weekly returns (R
2 = 0.32).
Descriptive statistics for the resulting abnormal returns are given in table 7. Notice that the number of
observations is higher (647 versus 576), since some data were lost in the calculation of stock price
volatility used as in input in the distance to default and there were missing values for other inputs. The
mean for the abnormal returns is equal to zero, as expected. The minimum and maximum are quite high
and are caused by exceptional cases: the maximum is due to Banca di Napoli in January 1998 and the
minimum is due to Banco Espanol de Credito in February 1994. Note that outliers should not be a
problem, given that we consider the presence in the tail rather than the absolute size of returns.
The comparison between the actual abnormal return data and the simulations are reported in Table 6b,
which is constructed in the same way as Tables 6 and 6a above. It shows that we observe significantly
fewer instances, in which many banks experienced a bottom tail event concurrently, compared to the other
two measures. This is not entirely surprising, because we have eliminated at least some macro shocks as a
source for the concurrent presence in the tail of the distribution of more than one bank. It is striking,
however, to observe that as for the two measures used before, the normal distribution is unable to replicate
the observed frequencies of co-exceedances. Further, even when assuming fat tailed distributions such as
the student t distribution with 5 and 10 degrees of freedom, in many countries we can reject that such
distributions adequately describe the observed patterns. Note one important conceptual difference between
the distance to default and abnormal returns. The distance to default is declining in the volatility of the
underlying assets, while returns are increasing in asset volatility (see Goh and Ederington, 1993; Gropp et
                                                     
12  In most cases the number of extreme observations was approximately the same and deviations were small, i.e. no
more than one bank. For example, looking at the negative tail for Italy, during weeks with 6 or more banks in the
tail in the first differences of the distance to default distribution (Table 6), there were at least 4 banks in the tail of
the log difference distribution. The same holds for the positive tail: the two extra observations in table 6a, had
respectively 5 and 4 banks in the tails when the first difference of the distances to default was used.
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13  While
we examine results for abnormal returns also below, we view this as a major caveat and would place
greater emphasis on results obtained using the distance to default as a measure of bank risk.
14
We reach similar conclusions when considering cross-country co-exceedances. The results for the log-
differenced distance to default, the first differenced distance to default and abnormal returns are reported
in Tables 8, 8a and 8b, respectively. We performed exactly the same exercise, simulating multivariate
Normal and student t distributions with 5 and 10 degrees of freedom, using the historical variance-
covariance matrix to replicate the patterns of co-exceedances reported in Table 5. In case of the log-
differenced distance to default, neither the multivariate Normal nor the student t distributions can replicate
the patterns of co-exceedances observed in the data for any country pair, except for Germany-France. In
all cases (aside from Germany-France) we can reject equality based on the 5 percent simulated confidence
band at least for some level of co-exceedances. This is true for the bottom as well as for the top tail co-
exceedances. Again, patterns are strikingly similar for the log-differenced distance to default (Table 8a),
although in this case there is rejection in all cases. Finally, for the abnormal returns, we find that we
cannot reject that the simulated patterns coincide with actual patterns for two country pairs: Germany-
France and France-Spain. Nevertheless, the difference for the cross-border co-exceedances between the
three measures seem even smaller than in the case of within country co-exceedances and the inability of
the simulations to replicate the patterns observed in the data even more striking.
Table 9 gives some summery statistics for the Monte Carlo Simulations. Overall, the normal distribution is
unable to explain the patterns in the data. There is virtually no country or country pair, in which there is
not at least one rejection. The fatter tails student t distributions, especially the student t with 10 degrees of
freedom, do slightly better, but for all measures there are only few countries or country pairs, for which
there is not at least one rejection. While our simulation difficulties may ultimately concern only a
relatively small number of observations, the events that occur “too often” compared to multivariate
Normal or student t distributions may be precisely those one would be interested in from the perspective
of bank contagion.
4.2 Differences in conditional sample frequencies: A measure of net
contagious influence
Given this evidence in favour of non-linearities in the tail of the distribution, there are a number of
avenues for how to proceed. Bae et al. (2003) propose a multinomial logistic regression model, utilising
the fact that the co-presence of observations in the tails can be modelled as a polychotomous variable.
Alternatively, GARCH-M models, modelling changing volatilities asymmetrically, may also be a way
forward (see e.g. Ang and Chen, 2002). We follow a different approach, refraining from making any
                                                     
13 The increase in stock prices in response, say, to an increase in leverage may result in a positive abnormal return,
while the distance to default will decline.
14 We also examined the sensitivity of the results to the choice of the size of the tail. While all calculations in the
paper were performed for 5 percent tails, we redid the analysis for 10 percent tails and found virtually identical
results for the difference in the distance to default. The results are available upon request.
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parametric measure of net contagious influence of bank A on bank B
) / ( ) / ( / T T T T B A B A P A B P − = Ω ,( 6 )
where  ) / ( T T A B P  denotes probability that bank B is in the tail of the distribution in some period given
that bank A is also in the tail. Expression (6) is simply the difference in the observed conditional sample
frequencies of bank A and bank B experiencing a tail event. Under which circumstances does (6) give us
an accurate signal regarding the net contagious influence between the two banks? To see this, assume that
all shocks are i.i.d. over time. Suppose further that idiosyncratic shocks and the macro shock are jointly
distributed. In addition, we need to define some notation:
(i)  IS  represents the realisation of bank I’s idiosyncratic shock, where I ε  (A,B).
(ii)  IT  represents the event that bank I is in the tail of the distribution.
(iii)  M is the realisation of the common shock. A common shock is defined such that upon its
realisation both banks are in the tail.
(iv)  pAB represents the probability that there is contagious influence from bank A to bank B. We
define contagious influence such that bank B is not hit by a shock (either common or
idiosyncratic) but is in the tail and A is hit by an idiosyncratic shock, which through contagious
influence results in bank B experiencing a tail event.
We claim that there is net contagious influence from bank A to bank B if pAB >pBA. Recall that for any two
banks A and B, bank A can be in the tail of the distribution if
(i)  it is hit by an idiosyncratic shock (AS) and B is or is not hit by an idiosyncratic shock, or
(ii)  if there is a common (macro) shock (M) affecting both banks simultaneously, or
(iii)  if bank B is hit by an idiosyncratic shock and there is contagion from bank B to bank A.
We do not assume that the system of the two banks A and B is closed. This means that we do not exclude
the possibility of outside contagion. However, if this outside contagion affects either bank individually,
this is observationally equivalent to an idiosyncratic shock affecting the bank and, hence, is subsumed
under IS. Similarly, suppose both banks experience contagion from some bank other than A and B. In our
framework this would be subsumed under the banks experiencing a common shock. Note that the phrase
common shock, as used here, is distinct from a macro shock affecting all banks; rather a common shock is
simply a shock affecting both banks, such that they are in the tail of the distance to default or abnormal
return distribution. This can, but must not be, a macro shock.
Breaking down the conditional probabilities of being in the tail into their components we obtain:
) ( ) , , ( ) , , ( ) , , (
) ( ) , , ( ) , , ( ) , , (
) | (
M pr p M B A pr M B A pr M B A pr
M pr p M B A pr p M B A pr M B A pr
A B p
BA S S S S S S
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=
A necessary condition for these probabilities to be defined is that the denominator of the two expressions
does not become zero. For this we need that each bank has some non-zero probability of experiencing an
idiosyncratic shock or that there exists some common shock.
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Condition (7) gives some idea about when the measure of contagious influence gives an accurate signal.
The accuracy of the signal is inversely related to the ratio of the probabilities that that bank A or bank B is
hit by an idiosyncratic shock. Put differently, if those probabilities are approximately equal, then the
measure identifies contagion accurately. Unfortunately, the measure may also understate or overstate true
contagion, if the difference in the probability of experiencing an idiosyncratic shock is large. For example,
suppose in reality there is no contagion (i.e. pBA=pAB=0), but bank B has a much higher probability of
experiencing an idiosyncratic shock compared to bank A (i.e. if pr(¬ AS, BS, ¬ M) >> pr(AS, ¬ BS, ¬ M)).
Condition (7) tells us that in this case, the measure may suggest contagion, even though there is none.
Conversely, suppose in reality there is contagion. If bank A is very likely to experience an idiosyncratic
shock (i.e. if pr(¬ AS, BS, ¬ M) << pr(AS, ¬ BS, ¬ M)), then the measure tends to understate true
contagion.
15
In order to illustrate the intuition behind equation (5) consider the example given in Figure 2. In Case 1,
there are five periods. In period 1 we observe that both banks are in the tail of the distribution of ∆dd and
in period 2, we see only bank B in the tail. This means that in period 2 bank B experienced an
idiosyncratic shock. If we assume that the probabilities of experiencing an idiosyncratic shock are equal
across the two banks then the two banks should have an equal number of realisations of the idiosyncratic
shock on average.
16 This means the presence of bank A in the tail in period 1 must be the realisation of an
idiosyncratic shock. In turn this implies that there was contagion from bank A to bank B. Hence, the
approach uses the information contained both in the realisation of idiosyncratic as well as common
shocks. Now consider Case 2. The only change involves period 3, in which both banks again are present in
the tail. As before, we observe that Bank B has a realisation of an idiosyncratic shock in period 2. Again,
this suggests that bank A must have experienced an idiosyncratic shock either in period 1 or in period 3,
which was transmitted through contagion to bank B. Why does  B A/ Ω  decline from 0.5 in Case 1 to 0.33
in Case 2? The reason is that we have information, which may suggest that the contagious influence from
bank A to bank B may be smaller. We know that there is contagion from bank A to bank B either in period
1 or 3. But we do not know what happened in the other period. Suppose there was contagion in period 1.
                                                     
15  In fact, given our assumption that the system is “open”,  ) , ( M B A pr s s ¬ ¬ is composed of the probability of
being his of an idiosyncratic shock plus the probability of experiencing contagion from some “outside” bank
B i ≠ . Hence, a somewhat less stringent requirement for  B A/ Ω   to give a correct signal is that the two
components be perfectly negatively correlated. If this is violated, holding the probability of experiencing an
idiosyncratic shock constant, the measure will understate contagion from banks with a lot of outside contagion to
banks with little outside contagion. This means that the measure understates contagion from banks, which
themselves experience a lot of contagion to banks which do not and may overstate contagion from banks, which
do not experience “outside” contagion to those that do.
16  Of course this is not necessarily true over five periods as in this example. In the actual data, there are around 600
periods.
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idiosyncratic shock. This means that the probability of contagion from A to B may be lower (but must not
be lower), hence the lower  B A/ Ω . In Case 3, bank B experiences one additional realisation of the
idiosyncratic shock in period 4. Again this provides additional information. Under the assumption that
both banks have an equal number of realisations of the idiosyncratic shock, in the two periods when both
banks are in the tail must be due to bank A experiencing an idiosyncratic shock and transmitting it to bank
B. The reason is that we know, if bank B shows two realisations of the idiosyncratic shock, bank A must
too. In the final Case 4, we cannot distinguish the case of a common shock affecting both banks in periods
1 and 3 from the possibility that in one period bank A transmitting its idiosyncratic shock to bank B and in
another the contagion goes the other way. Hence,  B A/ Ω  shows no “net contagious influence.”
This discussion has highlighted that the accurateness of the contagious influence measure proposed
depends on the difference between the probability of each bank to be hit by an idiosyncratic shock. The
example shows that if this probability is not equal, the signal given by  B A/ Ω  is not informative. This
probability of an idiosyncratic shock is unobservable. One solution to this problem may be to attempt to
control for the difference between the two probabilities through some bank characteristic, which may be
related to the likelihood of experiencing an idiosyncratic shock. The problem is that the variable should
also be orthogonal to the likelihood of being subject to contagion. In this paper, we use the size of the
bank as measured in total assets as a candidate variable. We view size as a summary variable of the
different business mix of large banks compared to small banks, which in turn tends to expose them to
different shocks. For example, large banks may have only very little exposure to the small business sector,
while small banks may conduct a majority of their business there. Similarly, large banks exposure to the
stock market or to foreign exchange markets may be much larger than the one of small banks.
17 Hence we
estimate












where SI  represents an indicator of the size of bank I (see below). We then calculate the “adjusted”
measure of net-contagious influence as the residuals of equation (8), i.e.
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To calculate S, we assign each bank a quartile ranking for size in each sample year (i.e. a ranking from 1





 can potentially vary from 0.25 to 4.
As 
*
/B A Ω  is a time invariant measure, we use simple averages over the ten-year sample period of the bank
characteristics. Put differently, we assign a quartile ranking in each year and then take an average of this
                                                     
17  Obviously, larger banks may also be better diversified compared to small banks and, hence, less likely to be
subject to contagion.
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is 67!/(65!-2!)=2211 observations.
Equation (8) is estimated separately for the log-differenced distance to default
18 and the abnormal returns.
In addition, we estimate equation (8) separately for negative and positive tails, and for both tails. The
estimated coefficients are reported in Table 10. Before we discuss them, we should clarify that we have no
particular prior about the sign of  1 ˆ β . If size is positively correlated with being exposed to idiosyncratic
risk, because larger banks have a greater exposure to volatile asset markets (especially if they take
significant unhedged positions), we would see a positive coefficient. If the diversification effect
dominates, we should see a negative coefficient. Table 10 shows that the estimated  1 ˆ β  is indeed positive
and significant at the 1 percent level in 5 of the 6 specifications. Only for negative tails of abnormal
returns, we find no significance. Note also, however, that while we explain between 24 and 35 percent of
the variation in 
*
/B A Ω  for log-differenced distances to default, equation (6) only explains very little of the
variation in 
*
/B A Ω  for abnormal returns.
Next, we examine the obtained results for 
*
/B A Ω  for the two measures of bank risk. The Spearman rank
correlation coefficient is 0.17 for positive tails, 0.09 for negative tails and 0.16 for both tails.
Independence can be rejected at any significance level. While this is encouraging, the correlation
coefficients are quite low and it may be instructive to examine whether the method yields consistent
signals across the measures of bank risk regarding which banks may be of particular systemic importance.
We use the term “systemic importance” here in the sense that banks with systemic importance are banks
which tend have net-contagious influence on other banks.
5. Systemic banks
5.1 Within country systemic banks
We define a bank i as having systemic importance within country y if
This simply suggests that if the sum of the net contagious influence of a bank with respect to its peers in
the same country is positive, it may have systemic importance for the banking system as a whole. We
report results for 
within
i Φ >0.1, in order to eliminate contagious influence that is very close to zero
19. The
                                                     
18  We report the results only for the log differences of the distance to default and not the results for the first
differences of the distances to default, since we saw in the simulations that both measures yield essentially
equivalent patterns of co-exceedances.
19 See table 11 for the statistics of the measure. The threshold of 
within
i Φ >0.1 does not imply any claim about
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in countries, where the sample contains more than one bank and that in countries where the sample only
contains two very large banks, we tend to not to be able to detect significant contagious influence.
20 This
excludes Belgium and in Austria, Denmark, Finland and Greece we are unable to identify systemically
important banks. In the table, we rank banks within countries, i.e. the bank listed first has the largest net-
contagious influence within a country. A first result is that there seems to be little difference between
considering negative versus positive tails or both tails jointly, but noticeable differences across the two
measures of bank risk (log-differenced distance to default and abnormal returns). Contagion, as measured
here, appears to be symmetric for negative and positive shocks. This finding will largely carry through to
cross-border contagion considered below.
Now consider the banks that one would have expected to have systemic importance judging simply from
their size in the country. These banks include Deutsche Bank and HVB (DE), and BBVA (ES). In
addition, while not the largest banks in the country, it is no surprise to find National Westminster Bank,
and HSBC (both UK) in this group, as well as Sanpaolo IMI,  Unicredito (both IT), Svenska
Handelsbanken (SE) and ING (NL). These results are largely unaffected whether we consider the log-
differenced distance to default or abnormal returns. However, there a number of important exceptions to
this consistency. One, using the log-differenced distance to default, we identify Dresdner Bank as
systemically important in Germany, BNP Paribas in France and a number of UK banks including Bank of
Scotland and Abbey National. Using abnormal returns, we no longer identify these banks and instead IKB
(DE), Societe Generale (FR) and Royal Bank of Scotland appear. We explain these inconsistencies across
the log-differenced distance to default and abnormal returns by their differences. An increase in stock
price volatility associated with an increase in the stock price will result in an unambiguously positive
abnormal return, while the effect is ambiguous on the distance to default. This is so because the distance
to default is declining in asset price volatility. Hence, the observed differences can very likely be
explained by differences in the type of shocks (rather than their frequency) that the banks experienced.
There are a number of additional surprises, mainly relating to Portuguese, Italian and Spanish banks. In
Portugal, instead of the largest bank in the country, Banco Comercial Portugues, Banco Espirito Santo is
identified, which is considerably smaller. The most surprising findings emerge for Italy and Spain. In
Spain, while BBVA and Banco Santander do appear in the table, neither is consistently identified as
systemically important, although they are by far the largest banks in Spain. Instead, we identify some of
the smallest banks in our sample: Banco Popular Espaniol (1/10 the size of Banco Santander), Banco
Guipuzcoano (1/60 of Banco Santander) and Banco Zaragozano (1/60 of Banco Santander). Similarly in
Italy, while Sanpaolo IMI is consistently identified and somewhat less consistently Unicredito, Banca
Intesa, the largest bank in Italy, does not appear at all. Instead, the method identifies a number of very
small banks as having contagious influence within Italy.
What can explain these surprising findings? Recall that the measure employed crucially depends on the
equality of the probability of being hit by an idiosyncratic shock. We used differences in size to proxy for
                                                     
20 Essentially we need at least some banks that are exposed to contagious influence.
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results limited to the largest banks in the sample.
5.2  Across country systemic banks
Analogously to identifying within country systemically important banks, we can also identify
systemically important banks for the sample countries as a whole. We define a bank i as systemically
important for banks in country Z if
Hence, this section attempts to identify banks that can be considered systemically important in the EU as a
whole. The results are summarised in Table 13, where we –as before- only report the banks with
across
i Φ >0.1.
21 Let us start with the expected. Deutsche Bank (#1 by total assets), Dresdner Bank (#6),
ABN Amro (#4), ING (#9), National Westminster Bank (#12), Danske Bank (#19) and HSBC (#15) are
all consistently identified as systemically important for the banks in the sample outside of their own
country. In addition, there is evidence that HBV (#2), BNP Paribas (#3), Banco Santander (#10) and
BBVA (#14) have some systemic importance, but the evidence is less clear. On the other hand, we have
surprises among the included as well as the omitted banks. Among the included banks, we find IKB (DE,
#42), Allied Irish Banks (#30) and Bank of Ireland (#31, both IE), BPI (PT, #49) and some very small
Spanish and Italian banks to have contagious influence. The notable omissions include Barclays (UK, #5),
Societe Generale (FR, #7) and Banca Intesa (IT, #11).
In order to ascertain to which extent this is due to insufficiently controlling for the likelihood of
idiosyncratic shocks, we redid the analysis, considering only banks above EUR 50 billion in total assets
(the 33 largest banks of the sample, see Table 3). The idea is that these banks may be more similar in
terms of their probability of experiencing an idiosyncratic shock. This exercise also addresses the question
of how sensitive the results are to the sample composition, i.e. whether or not a specific bank is included.
In addition, of course, the limitation gives an idea of contagion among the largest banks only, which may
be of independent interest. Table 14 shows that the results are quite robust. By definition, the smallest
banks no longer appear in the table, but those that do appear tend to be identical to those when using the
full sample.
                                                     
21 The list of banks would have been longer, of course, if we had reported all banks with 
across
i Φ > 0 (for the statistics
on this measure, see Table 11). While we do not make any claims about statistical significance, by using this
nonzero threshold, we exclude banks whose contagious influence is essentially zero. Note that the number of
banks differs somewhat, as banks in the same country do not enter 
across





k i /  contains 66 items (KBC is the only Belgian bank in the sample), while for Italian banks it contains 50
items, i.e. 67 total – 17 Italian banks.
It is clear that even banks with small or even negative 
across
i Φ may exercise some net contagious influence on
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among banks. For example, a bank would be found not to have any contagious influence based on
within
i Φ and 
across
i Φ , if, for example, it had a strong contagious influence on one bank, but was subject to
an equally strong contagious influence from another bank. In order to address this issue, we prepared
Table 15, which lists the number of banks that have contagious influence on at least three other banks. We
are considering “strong” contagious influence only; that is the upper 10 percent tail of the distribution of
*
/B A Ω . We report the results for cross-border contagion only. Comparing these results to those in Table
13, the main finding is that there is somewhat more consistency across the rows of the table.
Fundamentally, however, Tables 13 and 15 exhibit surprising consistency.
Finally, the data easily lend themselves to the preparation of “contagion charts”, in which the links among
the banking systems in different countries are graphically represented (Figures 3-7). We have limited
ourselves to showing the map for the largest five European countries. A thin arrow on the figure indicates
that there is some contagious influence from the banks in one country to another. A thick arrow indicates
that there is some contagious influence from the banks in one country on a bank that was identified as
systemically important within its own country in Table 12. The figures show how closely linked banking
systems of different countries are. For example, the link between German and UK banks seems to be quite
strong, as the banks in each country tend to have contagious influence on the systemically important banks
in the other. But there are also unidirectional links among countries. Considering the German chart once
more, Danish and Irish banks have contagious influence upon German banks, but not vice versa. How
should this be interpreted? Clearly the converse of contagious influence as described in this paper must be
some sort of exposure to risks in the other banking system (abstracting from pure contagion). Hence, the
thick arrow from Ireland to Germany in Figure 3 suggests that German banks are substantially exposed to
the Irish banking system. This exposure could manifest itself through direct exposures, i.e. in the money
market, in exposures through the payment system, ownership links and potential direct exposures to non-
financial sectors in the country. It would go beyond the scope of this paper to explore the exact nature of
these links, however; rather, we view these maps as a basis for further research into the underlying
fundamentals for these links.
6. Conclusions
This paper analyses bank contagion in a sample of 67 EU banks for the period 1991-2003. The
methodology employed builds upon previous work on financial market contagion (Bae et al., 2003). First,
we analyse the properties of three weekly indicators: the simple first difference of the distance to default
(measuring absolute shocks), the log-differenced distance to default (percentage shocks) and, as a
robustness check, abnormal returns. Monte Carlo simulations show that the patterns observed in the tails
of the data, regardless of the measure used, are inconsistent with standard multivariate Normal or student t
distributions, suggesting substantial non-linearities. Based on this finding the paper proposes a simple
non-parametric measure of what is labelled “net contagious influence”. We show that this measure may be
able to accurately measure contagion among any bank pair, as long as the probabilities of an idiosyncratic
ECB • Working Paper No 297 • December 2003 24shock hitting the two banks are quite similar. We control for differences in these probabilities by adjusting
our measure for bank size, arguing that bank size may pick up important differences in the business mix of
banks.
We use the measure to identify banks, which have systemic importance within countries and across
countries. While the results seem quite sensible for most countries, in Italy and Spain, the measure seems
to suggest that an unreasonable number of very small banks have systemic importance. We argue that the
reason for this uncomfortable finding may be that Italian and Spanish small banks have a particularly low
probability of experiencing an idiosyncratic shock and hence our measure overstates contagion of these
banks with respect to other banks. Overall, the paper shows that there may be tight links among banks
within countries, as well as links connecting the major banking systems in Europe. We do not detect a
major difference between the strength of links among euro area versus non-euro area countries.
We view the paper as a first step towards devising market based indicators of how vulnerable banks and
banking systems may be to contagion. The measure of contagion suggested in this paper has the advantage
of being able to identify the direction of contagious influence among banks, although only on a “net”
basis. The results presented in the paper may provide a basis to obtain a better understanding of the extent
to which European banking systems have become interconnected and how banking problems could spread
across borders. The paper, however, is a purely statistical exercise and to explain the patterns obtained in
this paper with fundamentals remains an important avenue for future research.
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Coefficient Standard error Coefficient  Standard error T-value
        
1 Bank Austria 0.093 0.187 0.867 0.095 9.135 0.164
2 Creditanstalt -0.065 0.172 1.095 0.066 16.687 0.402
3 KBC Bank 0.078 0.102 1.194 0.045 26.274 0.504
4 Bankgesellschaft Berlin -0.249 0.177 0.727 0.066 11.021 0.152
5 Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank -0.090 0.138 1.208 0.051 23.474 0.448
6 BHF-BANK 0.109 0.127 0.563 0.049 11.489 0.168
7 Commerzbank -0.148 0.123 1.191 0.046 26.057 0.500
8 DePfa Group 0.096 0.149 0.601 0.056 10.761 0.158
9 Deutsche Bank AG -0.046 0.100 1.194 0.037 32.197 0.604
10 Dresdner Bank, AG 0.045 0.119 0.903 0.047 19.231 0.362
11 IKB Deutsche Industriebank -0.010 0.086 0.417 0.032 13.099 0.202
12 Danske Bank 0.068 0.103 0.952 0.045 21.132 0.397
13 Jyske Bank 0.068 0.110 0.632 0.048 13.193 0.204
14 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria 0.022 0.101 1.337 0.034 38.805 0.689
15 Banco Espanol de Credito -0.249 0.219 0.781 0.075 10.477 0.139
16 Banco Guipuzcoano 0.101 0.088 0.221 0.030 7.381 0.074
17 Banco Pastor 0.131 0.115 0.426 0.039 10.840 0.148
18 Banco Popular Espanol 0.154 0.111 0.821 0.038 21.751 0.411
19 Banco Santander Central Hispano -0.016 0.110 1.335 0.038 35.501 0.650
20 Banco Zaragozano 0.044 0.126 0.465 0.043 10.814 0.147
21 Okobank 0.046 0.164 0.184 0.034 5.345 0.042
22 Sampo Leonia -0.021 0.233 0.581 0.050 11.617 0.166
23 BNP Paribas -0.008 0.169 1.209 0.059 20.665 0.470
24 CPR -0.139 0.181 0.618 0.071 8.750 0.116
25 Natexis Banques Populaires -0.068 0.143 0.659 0.052 12.692 0.192
26 Societe Generale 0.035 0.141 1.276 0.051 24.916 0.478
27 Alpha Bank 0.059 0.124 1.024 0.026 40.083 0.703
28 Commercial Bank of Greece -0.028 0.156 1.258 0.032 38.989 0.691
29 Allied Irish Banks 0.052 0.106 1.172 0.041 28.707 0.548
30 Anglo Irish Bankcorp 0.183 0.147 0.805 0.057 14.231 0.230
31 Bank of Ireland 0.122 0.102 1.181 0.039 29.910 0.569
32 Banca Agricola Mantovana 0.081 0.104 0.325 0.031 10.408 0.138
33 Banca Intesa 0.048 0.172 0.998 0.051 19.435 0.357
34 Banca di Roma -0.249 0.172 1.203 0.051 23.392 0.446
35 Banca Lombarda 0.121 0.118 0.342 0.035 9.739 0.123
36 Banca Pop Bergamo 0.063 0.112 0.498 0.033 14.882 0.246
37 Banca Popolare Commercio e Industria -0.046 0.133 0.533 0.040 13.347 0.208
38 Banca Popolare di Intra 0.125 0.118 0.410 0.035 11.596 0.165
39 Banca Popolare di Lodi -0.028 0.134 0.502 0.040 12.492 0.187
40 Banca Popolare di Milano -0.066 0.150 0.782 0.045 17.438 0.309
41 Banca Popolare di Verona -0.018 0.157 0.610 0.047 12.987 0.199
42 Banco di Desio e della Brianza 0.134 0.197 0.455 0.058 7.841 0.133
43 Banco di Napoli -0.160 0.311 0.697 0.091 7.638 0.101
44 Credito Emiliano -0.068 0.202 0.724 0.061 11.961 0.174
45 Credito Valtellinese 0.014 0.100 0.400 0.030 13.425 0.210
46 Rolo Banca 1473 0.128 0.165 0.763 0.048 15.865 0.307
47 Sanpaolo IMI -0.106 0.157 0.986 0.046 21.590 0.454
48 UniCredito Italiano 0.086 0.151 1.142 0.045 25.315 0.486
49 ABN AMRO Bank N.V. 0.027 0.110 1.259 0.044 28.923 0.565
50 ING Bank NV -0.003 0.110 1.455 0.043 33.668 0.647
51 Kas-Associatie N.V. 0.148 0.141 0.512 0.057 8.990 0.106
52 Banco Comercial Portugues -0.010 0.104 1.008 0.044 22.723 0.432
53 Banco Espirito Santo 0.090 0.112 0.903 0.046 19.688 0.420
54 Banco Totta e Acores 0.080 0.124 0.675 0.053 12.846 0.196
55 BPI-SGPS -0.015 0.150 1.259 0.064 19.780 0.366
56 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken -0.033 0.259 0.897 0.075 11.979 0.174
57 Svenska Handelsbanken 0.149 0.190 0.653 0.055 11.936 0.173
58 Abbey National plc 0.051 0.136 1.150 0.062 18.592 0.337
59 Bank of Scotland 0.115 0.154 1.421 0.075 18.995 0.384
60 Barclays 0.070 0.132 1.423 0.060 23.639 0.451
61 Close Brothers 0.166 0.159 0.798 0.072 11.018 0.152
62 National Westminster Bank -0.063 0.161 1.531 0.080 19.180 0.415
63 Schroders 0.103 0.159 1.081 0.072 15.002 0.249
64 Singer & Friedlander Group 0.060 0.155 0.622 0.071 8.827 0.103
65 Standard Chartered 0.116 0.164 1.575 0.075 21.079 0.396
66 HSBC 0.190 0.142 1.487 0.064 23.300 0.498
67 Royal Bank of Scotland 0.174 0.143 1.445 0.065 22.237 0.421
Average 0.028 0.145 0.887 0.052 18.015 0.320
α0 α1
Appendix A. Results from a one factor market model
Results from estimating equation (4) in the text. Dependent variable is the log return of bank i in week t, the independent variable is the log return of the   
market portfolio (broad market indices) of country c, in which the bank has its headquarters.
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This figure shows the number of tail events per week in ln(∆dd). The tail is defined as the 5% largest
(positive tail) and smallest (negative tail) observations of the distribution of ln(∆dd). Panel A shows the
histogram of both tails simultaneously. Panel B and panel C represent the number of tail events in the






































































































































































































































































ECB • Working Paper No 297 • December 2003  29Figure 2. A simple example
* denotes a tail event. x=A,B.
Case 1 Case 2
Period Bank A Bank B Period Bank A Bank B
1 ** 1 ** 2 * 2 * 33 ** 44
55
Pr(x in tail) 0.20 0.40 Pr(x in tail) 0.40 0.60
Pr(A and B in tail) 0.20 0.20 Pr(A and B in tail) 0.40 0.40
Omega Omega
Case 3 Case 4
Period Bank A Bank B Period Bank A Bank B
1 ** 1 ** 2 * 2 * 3 ** 3 ** 4 * 4 * 55
Pr(x in tail) 0.40 0.80 Pr(x in tail) 0.60 0.60




ECB • Working Paper No 297 • December 2003 30Figure 3. Cross-border contagious influence: Germany
Thin arrow: Banks in country A have some contagious influence to at least one bank in country B.
Thick arrow: Banks in country A have contagious influence to a bank in country B with within country systemic
importance.
ECB • Working Paper No 297 • December 2003  31Figure 4. Cross-border contagious influence: Spain
Thin arrow: Banks in country A have some contagious influence to at least one bank in country B.
Thick arrow: Banks in country A have contagious influence to a bank in country B with within country systemic
importance.
ECB • Working Paper No 297 • December 2003 32Figure 5. Cross-border contagious influence: France
Thin arrow: Banks in country A have some contagious influence to at least one bank in country B.
Thick arrow: Banks in country A have contagious influence to a bank in country B with within country systemic
importance.
ECB • Working Paper No 297 • December 2003  33Figure 6. Cross-border contagious influence: Italy
Thin arrow: Banks in country A have some contagious influence to at least one bank in country B.
Thick arrow: Banks in country A have contagious influence to a bank in country B with within country systemic
importance.
ECB • Working Paper No 297 • December 2003 34Figure 7. Cross-border contagious influence: UK
Thin arrow: Banks in country A have some contagious influence to at least one bank in country B.
Thick arrow: Banks in country A have contagious influence to a bank in country B with within country systemic
importance.
ECB • Working Paper No 297 • December 2003  35Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the distances to default
Mean Minimum Maximum Standard
deviation
Distance to default 4.03 -0.29 17.11 1.88
Log-differenced DD -0.0003 -1.47 1.25 0.031
Total assets (in billions of euro) 152.0 2.8 927.9 198.5
Number of observations 576 351 628 77.0
Number of tail observations 60.1 20 125 28.6
Table 2. Sample composition and coverage by country












The Netherlands 3 58.9%
Portugal 4 53.7%
Sweden 2 79.2%
United Kingdom 10 72.8%
Total 67 53.9% 1/
1/ Total assets of banks in the sample divided by total assets of commercial banks of all
countries.
ECB • Working Paper No 297 • December 2003 36 Table 3. Sample banks (sorted by total assets in 2000, millions of euro)
1 Deutsche Bank AG DE       927,900
2 Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank       694,300
3 BNP Paribas FR       693,053
4 ABN AMRO Bank N.V. NL       543,200
5 Barclays UK       486,936
6 Dresdner Bank, AG       482,600
7 Societe Generale       455,881
8C o m m e r z b a n k       454,500
9 ING Bank NV       406,393
10 Banco Santander Central Hispano ES       347,288
11 Banca Intesa IT       331,364
12 National Westminster Bank       294,695
13 Abbey National 293,395
14 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria       292,557
15 HSBC       288,339
16 Royal Bank of Scotland       206,176
17 Bankgesellschaft Berlin       203,534
18 UniCredito Italiano       202,649
19 Danske Bank DK       182,520
20 KBC Bank BE       176,909
21 Sanpaolo IMI       171,046
22 Bank Austria AT       164,669
23 Standard Chartered       161,964
24 DePfa Group       156,446
25 Bank of Scotland       136,288
26 Banca di Roma       132,729
27 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken (SEB) SE       118,261
28 Natexis Banques Populaires       113,131
29 Svenska Handelsbanken       112,804
30 Allied Irish Banks IE         77,932
31 Bank of Ireland         73,859
32 Banco Comercial Portugues PT         61,850
33 BHF-BANK         53,863
34 Rolo Banca 1473         47,044
35 Banco Espanol de Credito         44,381
36 Banca Pop Bergamo         37,670
37 Banco di Napoli         34,361
38 Banca Popolare di Lodi         34,223
39 Creditanstalt         34,040
40 Banco Espirito Santo         33,862
41 Sampo Leonia FI         32,795
42 IKB Deutsche Industriebank         32,359
43 Banco Popular Espanol         31,288
44 Alpha Bank GR         30,183
45 Banca Popolare di Milano         28,282
46 Okobank         27,086
47 Banca Lombarda         26,816
48 Banco Totta e Acores         23,166
49 BPI-SGPS         21,906
50 Banca Popolare di Novara         20,959
51 Banca Popolare Commercio e Industria         20,911
52 Jyske Bank         17,044
53 Commercial Bank of Greece         16,164
54 Credito Emiliano         15,148
55 Anglo Irish Bankcorp         11,047
56 Banca Agricola Mantovana         10,190
57 Banco Pastor           9,404
58 CPR           8,616
59 Credito Valtellinese           7,416
60 Banco Guipuzcoano           5,518
61 Kas-Associatie N.V.           5,417
62 Banco Zaragozano           5,175
63 Schroders           4,180
64 Banca Popolare di Intra           3,929
65 Close Brothers           3,241
66 Singer & Friedlander Group           2,792
67 Banco di Desio e della Brianza           2,776
ECB • Working Paper No 297 • December 2003  37Table 4. Summary statistics of (co-) exceedances for weekly log-differenced distance to defaults for EU banks
Number of (co-) exceedances in the bottom tails Number of (co-) exceedances in the top tails
> 6 543210012345 > 6
D E  ( 8  b a n k s ) 3389 2 0 7 9 4 1 6 4 0 7 8 3 2 9 9631
ES (7 banks) 1 1 5 11 29 98 483 483 102 22 12 7 2 0
FR (3 banks) - - - 2 15 29 384 382 34 11 3 - - -
IE (3 banks) - - - 7 15 43 563 555 56 13 4 - - -
IT (10 banks) 5 3 5 10 36 114 403 411 105 27 18 8 2 5
NL (3 banks) - - - 3 11 40 418 417 46 2 7 - - -
PT (4 banks) - - 3 7 9 46 420 412 56 11 5 1 - -
U K  ( 7  b a n k s ) 0616 3 3 1 0 2 4 8 0 4 7 7 1 0 9 2 5 1 0 601
ECB • Working Paper No 297 • December 2003 38Table 5. Summary statistics of (co-) exceedances for weekly log-differenced distance defaults for EU banks, cross country evidence
In parenthesis the number of banks in each country. Co-exceedances are defined such that at least one bank from each country is in the tail. Hence zero co-exceedances means that many banks in one country can be in the tail
simultaneously. The Number of observations may differ across country groups, as they are determined by the bank with the least number of observations available. Only concurrent samples for banks were used.
Number of (co-) exceedances in the bottom tails Number of (co-) exceedances in the top tails
> 6 543210012345 > 6
ES-UK (7,7) 5 1 6 10 30 576 581 24 11 5 7 0
E S - D E  ( 7 , 8 ) 1 0 6987 4 9 8 4 9 4 1 1 1 0 94 1 0
E S - F R  ( 7 , 3 ) 3 3457 4 0 8 4 1 2 724 0 2 3
ES-IT (7,10) 8 2 4 18 24 520 512 24 12 8 9 11
D E - U K  ( 8 , 7 ) 9 2968 5 0 4 4 8 9 1 6 1 4 964
D E - F R  ( 8 , 3 ) 5 2245 3 8 4 3 8 0 95251
DE-IT (8,10) 10 3 8 9 15 493 483 22 12 5 5 11
F R - U K  ( 3 , 7 ) 4 1434 4 1 4 4 1 0 77321
F R - I T  ( 3 , 1 0 ) 5 1466 4 0 8 4 0 6 1 1 1345
UK-IT (7,10) 10 3 6 12 19 526 522 22 7 11 5 9
ECB • Working Paper No 297 • December 2003 39Table 6. Monte Carlo Simulations of co-exceedances of weekly logdifferenced distance to defaults for EU banks
Reported are the mean number of co-exceedances under the different distributional assumptions, given the actual covariance matrix. Figures in bold denote that equality can be rejected at the 5 percent confidence level.
Number of (co-) exceedances in the bottom tails Number of (co-) exceedances in the top tails
> 6 543210012345 > 6
DE (8 banks) 3 3 8 9 20 79 416 407 83 29 9 6 3 1
   Normal 0.70 1.48 3.52 7.93 26.29 112.78 385.29 385.62 112.32 26.43 7.85 3.50 1.60 0.69
   Student t(5) 3.31 4.26 7.26 11.43 22.66 63.94 425.14 424.97 64.21 22.56 11.53 7.17 4.22 3.34
   Student t(10) 2.22 3.63 6.57 11.52 24.14 73.71 416.21 416.32 73.63 24.06 11.59 6.51 3.63 2.27
ES (7 banks) 1 1 5 11 29 98 483 483 102 22 12 7 2 0
   Normal 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.95 16.68 183.43 426.85 426.04 184.84 16.25 0.81 0.05 0.00 0.00
   Student t(5) 0.55 1.64 4.93 12.35 30.33 91.00 487.20 487.14 90.99 30.50 12.29 4.86 1.68 0.54
   Student t(10) 0.23 0.99 3.72 10.91 30.68 104.67 476.80 477.10 104.16 30.90 10.86 3.67 1.07 0.24
FR (3 banks) - - - 2 15 29 384 382 34 11 3 - - -
   Normal 0.94 11.22 39.72 378.11 377.69 41.68 9.57 1.06
   Student t(5) 2.32 11.07 35.90 380.71 381.34 35.56 10.85 2.25
   Student t(10) 1.74 10.45 38.90 378.92 379.71 38.24 10.41 1.65
IE (3 banks) - - - 7 15 43 563 555 56 13 4 - - -
   Normal 1.66 11.76 65.51 549.08 549.17 65.43 11.65 1.76
   Student t(5) 3.41 14.91 53.96 555.73 555.54 54.28 14.82 3.36
   Student t(10) 2.44 14.02 58.62 552.91 553.16 58.26 14.01 2.57
IT (10 banks) 5 3 5 10 36 114 403 411 105 27 18 8 2 5
   Normal 0.16 0.54 2.21 9.40 41.15 164.97 357.59 356.62 166.14 41.32 9.22 2.09 0.48 0.13
   Student t(5) 2.90 3.85 7.99 16.62 36.28 95.47 412.89 413.26 95.10 36.25 16.53 8.06 3.87 2.93
   Student t(10) 1.54 2.79 6.73 15.82 38.92 111.97 398.24 397.78 112.62 39.04 15.51 6.70 2.78 1.58
NL (3 banks) - - - 3 11 40 418 417 46 2 7
   Normal 1.05 6.89 54.06 410.00 407.57 58.58 5.11 0.73
   Student t(5) 2.58 11.81 39.63 417.98 418.06 39.37 12.06 2.5
   Student t(10) 1.78 11.32 43.04 415.87 415.90 43.03 11.25 1.82
PT (4 banks) - - 3 7 9 46 420 412 56 11 5 1 - -
   Normal 0.11 1.08 7.41 78.51 397.89 396.83 80.48 6.66 0.94 0.10
   Student t(5) 0.77 4.17 14.10 53.21 412.75 413.04 52.79 14.11 4.24 0.82
   Student t(10) 0.49 3.34 13.44 58.14 409.59 409.69 57.97 13.48 3.40 0.47
UK (8 banks) 0 6 1 6 33 102 480 477 109 25 10 6 0 1
   Normal 0.04 0.18 0.85 4.40 28.79 144.69 449.05 450.86 142.12 28.77 4.96 1.00 0.24 0.04
   Student t(5) 0.84 2.28 5.78 12.43 28.96 85.19 492.54 492.31 85.42 28.97 12.62 5.60 2.25 0.83
   Student t(10) 0.39 1.52 4.54 11.32 29.87 98.14 482.22 482.90 97.14 30.00 11.40 4.62 1.50 0.43
ECB • Working Paper No 297 • December 2003 40Table 6a. Monte Carlo Simulations of co-exceedances of weekly first differenced distance to defaults for EU banks
Reported are the mean number of co-exceedances under the different distributional assumptions, given the actual covariance matrix. Figures in bold denote that equality can be rejected at the 5 percent confidence level.
Number of (co-) exceedances in the bottom tails Number of (co-) exceedances in the top tails
> 6 543210012345 > 6
DE (8 banks) 4 1 5 18 17 77 416 402 93 26 8 4 2 3
   Normal 0.78 2.29 5.09 10.82 24.88 96.20 397.95 395.78 99.45 24.47 10.47 4.89 2.13 0.81
   Student t(5) 3.74 4.51 7.34 11.24 21.47 62.55 427.15 427.78 61.92 21.41 11.14 7.32 4.54 3.89
   Student t(10) 2.72 4.02 7.00 11.24 22.70 70.57 419.75 419.70 70.63 22.69 11.22 7.06 4.00 2.71
ES (7 banks) 1 0 3 9 26 123 466 478 107 26 8 8 1 0
   Normal 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.67 18.91 180.15 428.27 428.40 179.90 19.02 0.67 0.02 0.00 0.00
   Student t(5) 0.35 1.47 4.51 11.91 30.55 95.85 483.46 483.30 96.12 30.48 11.69 4.61 1.44 0.36
   Student t(10) 0.12 0.81 3.17 10.39 30.50 110.40 472.61 472.38 110.78 30.44 10.24 3.30 0.73 0.13
FR (3 banks) - - - 3 9 38 380 378 40 11 1 - - -
   Normal 0.97 7.21 47.67 374.15 372.95 50.89 5.38 0.79
   Student t(5) 1.99 10.76 37.51 379.74 380.29 37.38 10.36 1.97
   Student t(10) 1.50 10.04 40.42 378.04 378.67 40.16 9.69 1.49
IE (3 banks) - - - 7 14 45 562 553 59 13 3 - - -
   Normal 1.40 14.96 59.87 551.77 551.82 59.80 14.94 1.44
   Student t(5) 3.63 15.03 53.07 556.58 556.49 52.74 15.04 3.73
   Student t(10) 2.89 14.23 56.86 554.02 553.77 57.24 14.21 2.78
IT (10 banks) 4 4 3 12 39 114 400 398 115 38 12 7 3 3
   Normal 0.00 0.00 0.05 2.66 38.78 202.24 332.26 332.88 201.02 39.38 2.68 0.05 0.00 0.00
   Student t(5) 2.49 3.76 7.94 16.50 37.00 97.69 410.60 410.42 98.06 36.91 16.49 7.83 3.71 2.58
   Student t(10) 1.30 2.53 6.27 15.61 39.59 115.99 394.71 394.88 115.77 39.62 15.54 6.35 2.56 1.28
NL (3 banks) - - - 1 13 42 416 417 44 6 5 - - -
   Normal 0.56 4.76 59.81 406.87 405.093 63.22 3.28 0.41
   Student t(5) 1.99 11.28 42.47 416.26 416.21 42.60 11.17 2.02
   Student t(10) 1.47 10.66 45.30 414.59 414.29 45.85 10.44 1.43
PT (4 banks) - - 2 5 11 52 415 409 61 10 4 1 - -
   Normal 0.08 1.13 9.59 74.12 400.08 399.58 74.96 9.40 0.99 0.07
   Student t(5) 0.62 3.87 14.07 54.80 411.65 411.47 55.10 14.04 3.78 0.62
   Student t(10) 0.37 2.81 13.22 60.65 407.95 407.98 60.65 13.15 2.85 0.38
UK (8 banks) 1 1 5 2 29 125 465 467 124 24 8 3 1 1
   Normal 0.00 0.00 0.02 1.12 22.69 171.21 432.97 433.61 170.06 23.07 1.25 0.01 0.00 0.00
   Student t(5) 0.66 1.96 5.37 12.32 29.47 88.79 489.44 489.88 88.15 29.49 12.46 5.39 1.99 0.66
   Student t(10) 0.32 1.28 4.10 11.19 30.13 101.41 479.57 479.51 101.55 30.02 11.20 4.17 1.24 0.32
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Reported are the mean number of co-exceedances under the different distributional assumptions, given the actual covariance matrix. Figures in bold denote that equality can be rejected at the 5 percent confidence level.
Number of (co-) exceedances in the bottom tails Number of (co-) exceedances in the top tails
> 6 543210012345 > 6
DE (8 banks) 0 2 2 13 32 115 426 428 107 43 7 4 0 1
   Normal 0.02 0.21 1.21 6.48 32.30 145.95 403.83 404.40 144.84 32.82 6.50 1.22 0.20 0.03
   Student t(5) 0.70 1.78 4.94 12.89 33.34 97.63 438.72 439.24 96.85 33.55 12.78 5.04 1.88 0.67
   Student t(10) 0.25 0.97 3.48 11.05 34.14 114.24 425.87 426.41 113.38 34.34 11.11 3.52 0.99 0.26
ES (7 banks) 0 0 3 9 41 117 511 504 125 44 7 1 0 0
   Normal 0.00 0.02 0.27 3.18 27.81 171.71 478.03 477.58 172.36 27.81 2.99 0.24 0.02 0.00
   Student t(5) 0.13 0.73 3.05 10.99 35.64 117.11 513.35 513.39 116.92 35.79 11.05 3.05 0.68 0.13
   Student t(10) 0.03 0.28 1.62 8.18 35.02 135.34 500.52 500.04 136.12 34.91 8.02 1.61 0.28 0.03
FR (3 banks) - - - 1 14 41 427 429 39 12 3 - - -
   Normal 0.64 9.50 51.07 421.79 422.13 50.46 9.69 0.72
   Student t(5) 1.80 11.05 44.50 425.65 426.17 43.51 11.48 1.85
   Student t(10) 1.30 10.34 47.42 423.94 424.06 47.10 10.61 1.23
IE (3 banks) - - - 0 13 76 592 588 85 7 1 - - -
   Normal 0.37 6.40 88.11 586.13 586.28 87.83 6.51 0.39
   Student t(5) 1.59 12.78 71.67 594.96 594.93 71.67 12.88 1.52
   Student t(10) 0.96 11.00 77.13 591.92 591.71 77.50 10.88 0.91
IT (10 banks) 4 5 4 6 48 161 453 455 164 34 16 5 3 4
   Normal 0.10 0.55 2.75 13.04 52.88 181.78 429.91 430.42 181.12 52.76 13.20 2.90 0.51 0.11
   Student t(5) 2.60 4.02 8.93 19.99 45.36 117.58 482.52 482.68 117.15 45.68 19.88 9.03 4.00 2.58
   Student t(10) 1.19 2.48 7.02 18.64 48.81 139.50 463.38 463.26 139.48 49.15 18.51 6.93 2.49 1.18
NL (3 banks) - - - 1 15 60 544 533 82 4 1 - - -
   Normal 0.20 5.43 81.54 532.83 532.65 81.91 5.24 0.20
   Student t(5) 1.04 11.30 67.29 540.37 540.26 67.50 11.22 1.02
   Student t(10) 0.55 9.70 71.94 537.81 537.52 72.52 9.41 0.56
PT (4 banks) - - 0 0 10 61 332 337 54 9 3 0 - -
   Normal 0.01 0.36 6.53 66.83 329.27 329.28 66.79 6.60 0.33 0.01
   Student t(5) 0.12 1.41 10.17 55.93 335.36 335.62 55.52 10.25 1.47 0.14
   Student t(10) 0.05 0.84 8.60 61.08 332.43 332.35 61.27 8.47 0.87 0.05
UK (8 banks) 0 0 3 13 31 125 509 507 128 33 9 3 1 0
   Normal 0.01 0.08 0.77 5.51 32.93 152.08 489.62 489.85 151.71 32.96 5.63 0.76 0.08 0.01
   Student t(5) 0.21 0.98 3.61 11.78 35.53 110.95 517.94 517.65 111.53 35.53 11.74 3.52 0.98 0.22
   Student t(10) 0.06 0.46 2.09 9.27 35.07 128.99 505.06 504.99 129.03 35.08 9.31 2.12 0.41 0.06
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Mean Minimum Maximum Standard
deviation
∆ Distance to default -0.001 -3.97 6.69 0.15
Abnormal returns 0.000 -94.20 131.94 3.75
Number of observations 647 402 681 69.73
Number of tail observations 65 20 153 30.7
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Reported are the mean number of co-exceedances under the different distributional assumptions, given the actual covariance matrix. In parenthesis the number of banks in each country simulated. Co-exceedances are defined such
that at least one bank from each country is in the tail. Hence zero co-exceedances means that many banks in one country can be in the tail simultaneously. The Number of observations may differ across country groups, as they are
determined by the bank with the least number of observations available. Only concurrent samples for banks were used. Figures in bold denote that equality can be rejected at the 5 percent confidence level.
Number of (co-) exceedances in the bottom tails Number of (co-) exceedances in the top tails
> 6 54321 00 12345 > 6
ES-UK (7,7) 5 1 6 10 30 - 576 581 - 24 11 5 7 0
   Normal 0.22 0.72 2.92 11.95 34.72 577.47 580.29 32.48 11.48 2.84 0.67 0.23
   Student t(5) 9.80 7.32 11.21 16.21 20.35 563.11 563.45 20.25 16.05 11.17 7.33 9.76
   Student t (10) 6.40 5.92 10.21 16.35 22.71 566.42 566.23 22.89 16.35 10.09 6.00 6.45
E S - D E  ( 7 , 8 ) 1 0 6987- 4 9 8 4 9 4-1 1 1 0 94 1 0
   Normal 1.80 2.14 4.79 12.96 34.54 481.78 482.45 34.41 13.03 4.48 2.01 1.63
   Student t(5) 13.04 6.63 9.17 12.63 15.50 481.04 480.75 15.78 12.65 9.07 6.65 13.10
   Student t (10) 9.76 5.96 8.96 13.02 17.55 482.75 482.51 17.68 13.11 8.80 6.06 9.86
E S - F R  ( 7 , 3 ) 3 3457- 4 0 8 4 1 2-72423
   Normal 0.14 0.33 0.77 1.50 2.50 424.76 426.48 1.84 0.94 0.52 0.17 0.06
   Student t(5) 2.86 3.18 5.28 7.53 9.17 401.98 402.12 9.16 7.48 5.24 3.18 2.82
   Student t (10) 1.77 2.56 4.63 7.45 9.70 403.89 403.72 9.94 7.44 4.64 2.48 1.77
ES-IT (7,10) 8 2 4 18 24 520 512 24 12 8 9 11
   Normal 0.63 1.58 5.48 19.35 50.26 498.71 498.78 50.59 19.17 5.46 1.45 0.55
   Student t(5) 13.60 8.27 12.27 17.43 21.46 502.97 502.67 21.51 17.71 12.51 8.18 13.41
   Student t (10) 8.97 7.17 11.81 18.45 24.72 504.88 504.68 24.65 18.80 11.78 7.25 8.84
D E - U K  ( 8 , 7 ) 9 2968 5 0 4 4 8 9 1 6 1 4 964
   Normal 2.20 2.49 4.83 12.39 25.77 490.32 492.15 24.45 11.58 4.99 2.53 2.31
   Student t(5) 11.54 6.33 8.45 11.42 14.37 485.89 486.29 14.27 11.41 8.30 6.01 11.74
   Student t (10) 8.25 5.40 8.01 11.83 15.76 488.76 488.56 16.05 11.72 8.03 5.33 8.31
D E - F R  ( 8 , 3 ) 5 2245 3 8 4 3 8 0 95251
   Normal 0.29 0.35 0.71 1.42 2.12 397.11 396.04 2.87 1.66 0.82 0.37 0.26
   Student t(5) 3.72 2.74 4.27 6.35 8.03 376.90 376.76 8.12 6.40 4.31 2.77 3.63
   Student t (10) 2.48 2.29 3.76 6.21 8.54 378.71 378.76 8.58 6.09 3.77 2.31 2.49
DE-IT (8,10) 10 3 8 9 15 493 483 22 12 5 5 11
   Normal 3.95 3.86 7.95 17.51 34.30 470.44 470.76 33.71 17.89 7.93 3.87 3.84
   Student t(5) 16.63 7.60 10.26 13.85 16.25 473.41 473.57 16.17 13.76 10.21 7.68 16.61
   Student t (10) 12.61 7.03 10.07 14.59 18.89 474.83 474.64 18.85 14.95 10.16 7.12 12.28
F R - U K  ( 3 , 7 ) 4 1434 4 1 4 4 1 0 77321
   Normal 0.27 0.67 1.88 4.65 7.44 415.09 416.08 7.33 4.13 1.63 0.59 0.26
   Student t(5) 2.88 2.82 4.62 7.21 8.51 403.96 403.91 8.67 7.03 4.65 2.82 2.91
   Student t (10) 1.74 2.14 4.14 6.95 8.99 406.04 405.94 9.10 6.92 4.13 2.22 1.70
F R - I T  ( 3 , 1 0 ) 5 1466 4 0 8 4 0 6 1 1 1345
   Normal 0.23 0.39 0.82 1.89 2.93 423.74 414.94 2.53 1.44 0.62 0.27 0.20
   Student t(5) 4.78 3.33 5.11 7.42 8.86 400.49 400.73 8.69 7.43 5.01 3.48 4.67
   Student t (10) 2.92 2.68 4.52 7.61 9.88 402.40 402.56 9.63 7.62 4.58 2.69 2.92
UK-IT (7,10) 10 3 6 12 19 526 522 22 7 11 5 9
   Normal 1.22 2.30 6.28 17.00 34.04 515.16 517.70 32.33 16.26 6.23 2.26 1.23
   Student t(5) 14.26 8.31 12.15 16.80 20.32 504.17 504.17 20.41 16.91 12.17 8.29 14.05
   Student t (10) 9.76 7.34 11.83 18.18 23.50 505.40 505.83 23.42 18.08 11.66 7.51 9.50
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Reported are the mean number of co-exceedances under the different distributional assumptions, given the actual covariance matrix. In parenthesis the number of banks in each country simulated. Co-exceedances are defined such
that at least one bank from each country is in the tail. Hence zero co-exceedances means that many banks in one country can be in the tail simultaneously. The Number of observations may differ across country groups, as they are
determined by the bank with the least number of observations available. Only concurrent samples for banks were used. Figures in bold denote that equality can be rejected at the 5 percent confidence level.
Number of (co-) exceedances in the bottom tails Number of (co-) exceedances in the top tails
> 6 54321 00 12345 > 6
ES-UK (7,7) 5 1 6 10 30 - 576 581 - 24 11 5 7 0
   Normal 0.01 0.13 1.42 11.59 46.36 568.50 570.61 44.42 11.36 1.46 0.13 0.02
   Student t(5) 8.88 7.12 11.07 16.73 21.88 562.31 562.03 22.00 16.95 11.18 6.96 8.88
   Student t (10) 5.40 5.63 9.93 16.79 24.65 565.60 565.62 24.55 16.98 10.01 5.56 5.28
E S - D E  ( 7 , 8 ) 7 2 1 4 6 1 2- 4 9 7 4 9 2-1 7 9677
   Normal 1.96 2.59 5.19 11.80 28.39 488.08 487.29 30.25 11.70 4.85 2.35 1.56
   Student t(5) 12.52 6.38 8.78 12.39 15.53 482.41 482.67 15.61 12.16 8.79 6.29 12.47
   Student t (10) 9.36 5.69 8.44 12.27 17.52 484.73 484.86 17.34 12.55 8.32 5.66 9.27
E S - F R  ( 7 , 3 ) 2 113 1 4- 4 0 9 4 2 0-52102
   Normal 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.19 429.76 429.69 0.24 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00
   Student t(5) 2.04 2.69 4.84 7.62 9.96 402.84 402.91 10.01 7.62 4.82 2.59 2.04
   Student t (10) 1.14 1.98 4.13 7.38 10.43 404.94 405.17 10.44 7.28 4.08 1.90 1.13
ES-IT (7,10) 5 2 11 19 25 - 514 507 - 32 17 5 7 8
   Normal 0.02 0.21 2.47 17.95 59.05 496.32 495.98 59.14 18.18 2.48 0.21 0.01
   Student t(5) 12.48 8.19 12.52 18.44 22.91 501.46 501.16 22.98 18.47 12.80 8.01 12.58
   Student t (10) 7.95 6.63 11.82 19.29 26.55 503.78 503.36 26.51 19.43 11.87 6.98 7.85
DE-UK (8,7) 6 4 5 11 11 - 501 489 - 22 13 7 4 3
   Normal 2.10 2.58 5.05 11.07 24.70 492.50 495.30 22.93 10.47 4.72 2.44 2.14
   Student t(5) 11.05 5.80 7.97 11.00 13.84 488.34 488.48 13.94 10.93 7.89 5.86 10.91
   Student t (10) 7.64 5.07 7.35 11.02 15.42 491.49 491.32 15.54 10.95 7.51 4.98 7.71
D E - F R  ( 8 , 3 ) 4 1323- 3 8 9 3 8 7-75300
   Normal 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.20 0.51 401.17 400.60 0.94 0.33 0.09 0.03 0.02
   Student t(5) 2.84 2.44 4.06 6.35 8.45 377.86 377.91 8.34 6.38 4.09 2.44 2.84
   Student t (10) 1.65 1.90 3.42 5.98 8.83 380.23 380.01 9.02 5.97 3.44 1.89 1.68
DE-IT (8,10) 9 2 7 12 11 - 497 483 - 23 9 12 4 7
   Normal 2.03 2.95 6.79 16.43 33.21 476.59 474.68 34.61 17.00 6.84 2.92 1.96
   Student t(5) 16.04 7.33 9.86 13.18 15.59 476.00 475.94 15.78 12.94 9.99 7.18 16.16
   Student t (10) 11.86 6.69 9.62 13.85 18.28 477.71 478.00 18.13 13.75 9.42 6.77 11.93
F R - U K  ( 3 , 7 ) 3 1119- 4 1 5 4 0 8-1 1 9200
   Normal 0.01 0.06 0.34 1.64 4.45 423.50 422.64 5.16 1.76 0.38 0.05 0.01
   Student t(5) 2.16 2.47 4.34 7.18 8.93 404.92 404.86 8.98 7.14 4.38 2.48 2.15
   Student t (10) 1.12 1.74 3.65 6.71 9.68 407.09 407.34 9.57 6.66 3.50 1.73 1.21
F R - I T  ( 3 , 1 0 ) 4 044 1 1- 4 0 7 4 1 0-83333
   Normal 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.31 429.57 429.50 0.36 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.00
   Student t(5) 4.26 3.14 5.16 7.79 9.42 400.23 400.78 9.36 7.47 5.17 3.10 4.12
   Student t (10) 2.45 2.42 4.40 7.68 10.42 402.64 402.75 10.27 7.64 4.44 2.44 2.46
UK-IT (7,10) 6 4 8 15 29 - 514 514 - 27 22 5 4 4
   Normal 0.03 0.27 2.82 15.93 42.28 514.67 520.01 38.03 14.87 2.76 0.29 0.04
   Student t(5) 12.84 8.12 12.08 17.45 20.98 504.54 504.56 21.12 17.21 12.18 8.07 12.87
   Student t (10) 8.28 6.99 11.44 18.24 24.63 506.43 506.67 24.55 18.26 11.53 6.88 8.11
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Reported are the mean number of co-exceedances under the different distributional assumptions, given the actual covariance matrix. In parenthesis the number of banks in each country simulated. Co-exceedances are defined such that at least one bank from each
country is in the tail. Hence zero co-exceedances means that many banks in one country can be in the tail simultaneously. The Number of observations may differ across country groups, as they are determined by the bank with the least number of observations
available. Only concurrent samples for banks were used. Figures in bold denote that equality can be rejected at the 5 percent confidence level.
Number of (co-) exceedances in the bottom tails Number of (co-) exceedances in the top tails
> 6 54321 00 12345 > 6
ES-UK (7,7) 5 1 6 10 30 - 576 581 - 24 11 5 7 0
   Normal 0.18 0.83 3.74 14.03 36.38 625.84 625.55 36.64 14.17 3.71 0.78 0.17
   Student t(5) 5.31 6.48 12.39 21.57 28.51 606.74 606.76 28.58 21.45 12.31 6.62 5.29
   Student t (10) 2.16 4.09 9.83 20.42 32.51 611.99 611.68 32.73 20.66 9.80 3.94 2.19
ES-DE (7,8) 5 5 5 16 19 - 540 542 - 18 18 7 1 4
   Normal 0.29 1.17 4.74 16.21 37.77 529.83 529.82 37.83 16.14 4.70 1.17 0.35
   Student t(5) 6.49 6.57 11.52 18.86 24.74 521.83 522.32 24.26 18.86 11.50 6.59 6.48
   Student t (10) 3.03 4.33 9.57 18.69 28.02 526.37 526.21 27.99 18.74 9.57 4.50 3.01
ES-FR (7,3) 2 2 2 9 10 - 458 457 - 11 11 3 1 0
   Normal 0.03 0.21 1.46 6.85 17.41 457.04 457.79 16.79 6.79 1.44 0.19 0.02
   Student t(5) 1.11 2.00 4.67 9.28 12.45 453.49 455.39 11.58 8.40 4.52 2.02 1.09
   Student t (10) 0.47 1.12 3.38 8.09 13.26 456.69 458.50 12.09 7.76 3.17 1.05 0.42
ES-IT (7,10) 7 2 8 19 26 - 619 622 - 30 14 7 5 3
   Normal 0.42 1.52 5.77 18.41 41.15 613.73 614.05 40.83 18.29 5.84 1.52 0.48
   Student t(5) 10.22 8.65 14.62 22.67 28.19 596.66 596.72 27.88 22.63 14.75 8.70 10.33
   Student t (10) 4.94 6.08 12.40 23.05 33.24 601.29 601.19 33.54 22.69 12.41 6.18 4.98
DE-UK (8,7) 4 9 9 15 36 517 535 - 25 15 8 4 3
   Normal 0.56 1.68 5.61 16.34 33.62 532.19 532.60 33.18 16.30 5.61 1.75 0.57
   Student t(5) 7.16 6.82 11.88 18.71 23.91 521.52 521.68 23.42 18.93 11.93 6.79 7.25
   Student t (10) 3.73 4.92 10.00 18.59 27.60 525.17 525.20 27.23 18.82 10.07 4.99 3.68
DE-FR (8,3) 1 2 3 9 10 - 430 425 - 10 12 4 2 2
   Normal 0.23 0.73 2.51 7.67 15.49 428.37 427.998 15.44 7.92 2.59 0.82 0.25
   Student t(5) 2.34 2.75 5.13 8.74 11.41 424.64 423.86 11.44 8.94 5.41 2.94 2.40
   Student t (10) 1.20 1.92 4.12 8.05 12.50 427.21 426.55 12.32 8.43 4.45 2.01 1.24
DE-IT (8,10) 10 2 3 21 27 - 527 531 - 28 12 5 6 8
   Normal 1.05 2.85 7.61 20.01 37.15 521.71 520.70 37.75 19.96 7.88 2.66 1.06
   Student t(5) 12.25 8.68 13.44 19.48 23.43 512.71 512.25 23.76 19.68 13.67 8.68 11.96
   Student t (10) 6.58 6.92 12.35 20.74 28.05 515.37 515.01 28.10 20.80 12.56 6.83 6.70
F R - U K  ( 3 , 7 ) 2 1279- 4 6 2 4 6 0-1 1 5250
   Normal 0.10 0.45 1.85 5.95 12.26 462.39 462.58 12.09 5.93 1.85 0.45 0.10
   Student t(5) 1.48 2.36 4.95 9.11 12.27 452.82 452.95 12.01 9.14 5.03 2.35 1.54
   Student t (10) 0.67 1.42 3.70 8.18 13.39 455.63 456.03 12.79 8.28 3.74 1.45 0.71
F R - I T  ( 3 , 1 0 ) 4 1268- 4 6 2 4 5 9-4 1 2 233
   Normal 0.38 0.95 3.04 7.76 14.00 456.88 457.62 13.37 7.81 2.95 0.90 0.36
   Student t(5) 3.72 3.40 5.76 9.02 11.24 449.85 451.76 10.54 8.51 5.32 3.26 3.61
   Student t (10) 1.93 2.32 4.82 9.04 12.75 452.15 455.25 11.25 8.02 4.36 2.25 1.87
UK-IT (7,10) 9 8 6 21 28 - 609 611 - 41 13 4 5 7
   Normal 0.96 2.73 8.76 23.82 43.43 601.29 601.33 43.54 23.57 8.76 2.84 0.96
   Student t(5) 11.59 9.22 14.78 22.22 27.50 595.69 595.78 27.41 22.68 14.69 9.20 11.23
   Student t (10) 5.95 6.76 13.21 23.53 32.25 599.30 599.73 32.32 22.96 13.02 6.90 6.06
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Log-differenced distance to
default




   % rejections
      Bottom tails (total 45)
Multivariate normal 62.2% 73.3% 55.5%
Student t (5) 28.9% 24.4% 13.3%
Student t (10) 26.7% 20.0% 15.6%
      Top tails (total 45)
Multivariate normal 57.7% 62.2% 44.4%
Student t (5) 17.8% 17.8% 31.1%
Student t (10) 13.3% 15.6% 13.3%
   No rejection: # of countries (total 8)
      Bottom tails
Multivariate normal 0 0 1
Student t (5) 3 4 6
Student t (10) 3 3 5
      Top tails
Multivariate normal 1 1 2
Student t (5) 3 4 3
Student t (10) 5 4 5
      Both tails
Multivariate normal 0 0 0
Student t (5) 1 3 3
Student t (10) 1 1 5
Across country pairs
   % rejections
      Bottom tails (total 60)
Multivariate normal 61.7% 63.4% 36.7%
Student t (5) 30.0% 43.3% 25.0%
Student t (10) 18.3% 25.0% 20.0%
      Top tails (total 60)
Multivariate normal 61.7% 63.4% 35.0%
Student t (5) 21.7% 30.0% 30.0%
Student t (10) 15.0% 20.0% 23.3%
   No rejection: # of country pairs
   (total 10)
      Bottom tails
Multivariate normal 0 0 1
Student t (5) 1 0 2
Student t (10) 4 3 3
      Top tails
Multivariate normal 0 1 1
Student t (5) 2 2 2
Student t (10) 4 3 2
      Both tails
Multivariate normal 0 0 0
Student t (5) 0 0 2
Student t (10) 1 0 2
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influence
Dependent variable β0 β1 R
2 n
Log-differenced distance to default































*,**, *** denotes significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Coefficients for differences in sample
size not reported.
Table 11. Statistics of the measure Ω
*
i/j , Ω i
within and Ω i
across
This table presents the statistics for our measure used. For sake of brevity we only mention the statistics




minimum maximum Obs. 10% tail 5% tail
Ω
*
i/j ln(∆dd) 0.000 0.042 -0.292 0.172 2211 0.047 0.068
Ω
*
i/j abnormal returns 0.000 0.059 -0.303 0.239 2211 0.069 0.097
Ω i
within ln(∆dd) 0.000 0.309 -0.904 0.877 67 0.322 0.498
Ω i
within abnormal returns 0.000 0.549 -2.055 1.866 67 1.693 2.101
Ω i
across ln(∆dd) 0.000 1.488 -5.830 3.741 67 0.491 0.710
Ω i
across abnormal returns 0.000 2.177 -7.126 5.429 67 2.58 2.94
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All banks with 
within




Positive tail Negative tail Both tails Positive tail Negative tail Both tails
Austria None None None None None None
Belgium n.a. 1/ n.a. 1/ n.a. 1/ n.a. 1/ n.a. 1/ n.a. 1/
Germany HVB IKB Deutsche Bank Deutsche Bank Deutsche Bank Deutsche Bank
Deutsche Bank Deutsche Bank HVB IKB IKB IKB
Dresdner Bank Dresdner Bank BHF BHF
Denmark None None None None None None
Spain Banco Zaragozano Banco Popular Espaniol Banco Popular Espaniol Banco Guipuzcoano Banco Guipuzcoano Banco Guipuzcoano
Banco Santander Banco Pastor Banco Zaragozano BBVA
BBVA Banco Guipuzcoano
Banco Guipuzcoano
Finland None None None None None None
France BNP Paribas CPR BNP Paribas None Societe Generale Societe Generale
Greece None None None None None None
Ireland None None None Bank of Ireland Bank of Ireland Bank of Ireland
Italy Sanpaolo IMI Sanpaolo IMI Sanpaolo IMI Credito Valtellinese Credito Valtellinese Credito Valtellinese
Unicredito Rolo Banca Rolo Banca Banca Populare Bergamo Banca Agricola Mantovana Banca Populare Bergamo
Banca Populare di Milano Banca di Roma Unicredito Banco Desio d. Br. Banca Lombarda Banca Agricola Mantovana
Banco Desio d. Br. Banca Pop. D'Intra Banca Pop. Di Milano Banca Pop. Com. e Ind. Banca Populare Bergamo Banco Desio d. Br.
Rolo Banca Banca Populare Bergamo Banco Desio d. Br. Banca Agricola Mantovana Banca Pop. Com. e Ind. Banca Pop. Com. e Ind.
Banca Pop. Com. e Ind. Banco Desio d. Br. Banca di Roma Unicredito Banco Desio d. Br. Banca Lombarda
Banca Populare Bergamo Sanpaolo IMI Sanpaolo IMI Sanpaolo IMI
Banca Lombarda Rolo Banca Rolo Banca
Rolo Banca Banca Pop. D'Intra
The Netherlands ING None ING None ING None
Portugal None Banco Espirito Santo None Banco Espirito Santo Banco Espirito Santo Banco Espirito Santo
BPI
Sweden Svenska Handelsbanken Svenska Handelsbanken Svenska Handelsbanken None Svenska Handelsbanken Svenska Handelsbanken
United Kingdom National Westminster  National Westminster  National Westminster  National Westminster  HSBC HSBC
Bank of Scotland Bank of Scotland Bank of Scotland HSBC National Westminster  National Westminster 
Abbey National Abbey National Abbey National Royal Bank of Scotland
HSBC HSBC HSBC
Standard Chartered
Royal Bank of Scotland
1/ There is only one bank from Belgium in the sample.
Log-differenced distance to default Abnormal returns
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Only banks with 
across
i Φ >0.1 listed.
Country
Positive tail Negative tail Both tails Positive tail Negative tail Both tails
Austria None Creditanstalt None None Bank Austria None
Belgium None None None KBC KBC KBC
Germany Deutsche Bank IKB Deutsche Bank Deutsche Bank Deutsche Bank Deutsche Bank
HBV Deutsche Bank IKB IKB IKB IKB
Dresdner Bank HBV BHF BHF BHF
IKB Dresdner Bank Dresdner Bank Dresdner Bank Dresdner Bank
Commerzbank Commerzbank
Denmark Danske Bank Jyske Bank Jyske Bank Danske Bank Danske Bank Danske Bank
Jyske Bank Danske Bank Danske Bank Jyske Bank Jyske Bank Jyske Bank
Spain Banco Guipuzcoano Banco Pop. Esp. Banco Pop. Esp. Banco Guipuzcoano BBVA BBVA
Banco Zaragozano Banco Pastor Banco Pastor BBVA Banco Guipuzcoano Banco Guipuzcoano
Banco Zaragozano Banco Zaragozano Banco Santander Banco Pastor Banco Pastor
Banco Guipuzcoano Banco Guipuzcoano Banco Pop. Esp. Banco Pop. Esp. Banco Pop. Esp.
Banco Santander Banco Santander Banco Santander
Banco Zaragozano Banco Zaragozano Banco Zaragozano
Banco Pastor
Finland Okobank Okobank Okobank None None None
Sampo Leonia
France BNP Paribas CPR CPR None None None
CPR Natexis Banque Populaire Natexis Banque Populaire
Natexis Banque Populaire BNP Paribas
Greece None Alpha Bank None Alpha Bank None Alpha Bank
Ireland Allied Irish Bank Allied Irish Bank Allied Irish Bank Allied Irish Bank Allied Irish Bank Allied Irish Bank
Anglo Irish Bank Anglo Irish Bank Anglo Irish Bank Bank of Ireland Bank of Ireland Bank of Ireland
Bank of Ireland Bank of Ireland Bank of Ireland
Italy Banco Pop. Di Milano Rolo Banca Sanpaolo IMI Credito Valtellinese Credito Valtellinese Credito Valtellinese
Sanpaolo IMI Sanpaolo IMI Banca Pop. Di Milano Banca Agricola Mantovana Banca Agricola Mantovana Banca Agricola Mantovana
Unicredito Banca di Roma Rolo Banca Banca Pop. Bergamo Banca Lombarda Banca Lombarda
Banca Agricola Mantovana Credito Valtellinese Banca Com. E Indust. Banca Pop. Bergamo Banca Pop. Bergamo
Banco Desio e della Brianza Banco Desio d. Br. Banco Desio d. Br.
Banca Lombarda Banca Pop. D'Intra Banca Pop. D'Intra
The Netherlands ING None ING ING ING ING
Kas Associatie ABN Amro ABN Amro ABN Amro
ABN Amro Kas Associatie
Portugal None BPI BPI B. Comercial Port. B. Comercial Port. B. Comercial Port.
Banco Espirito Santo Banco Espirito Santo Banco Espirito Santo Banco Espirito Santo
BPI BPI BPI
Banco Totta e Acor. Banco Totta e Acor. Banco Totta e Acor.
Sweden Svenska Handelsbanken Svenska Handelsbanken Svenska Handelsbanken None None None
United Kingdom Abbey National Abbey National Abbey National National Westminster National Westminster HSBC
Bank of Scotland Royal Bank of Scotland HSBC HSBC HSBC National Westminster
National Westminster National Westminster Barclays
HSBC Barclays Bank of Scotland
Royal Bank of Scotland Standard Chartered Royal Bank of Scotland
Barclays HSBC National Westminster
Standard Chartered Bank of Scotland Standard Chartered
Log-differenced distance to default Abnormal returns
ECB • Working Paper No 297 • December 2003 50Table 14. Cross country contagious influence
Banks with total assets of EUR 50 billion or more
Only banks with 
across
i Φ >0.1 listed.
Country
Positive tail Negative tail Both tails Positive tail Negative tail Both tails
Austria (1) None None None None Bank Austria None
Belgium (1) None None None KBC KBC KBC
Germany (7) Deutsche Bank Deutsche Bank Deutsche Bank Deutsche Bank Deutsche Bank Deutsche Bank
Dresdner Bank HBV Dresdner Bank Dresdner Bank Dresdner Bank
HBV Dresdner Bank BHF BHF BHF
Commerzbank
Denmark (1) Danske Bank Danske Bank Danske Bank Danske Bank Danske Bank Danske Bank
Spain (2) None None None BBVA BBVA BBVA
Banco Santander Banco Santander Banco Santander
Finland (-) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
France (3) BNP Paribas Natexis Banque Populaire Natexis Banque Populaire None None None
Natexis Banque Populaire BNP Paribas
Greece (-) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Ireland (2) Allied Irish Bank Allied Irish Bank Allied Irish Bank Allied Irish Bank Allied Irish Bank Allied Irish Bank
Bank of Ireland Bank of Ireland Bank of Ireland Bank of Ireland Bank of Ireland Bank of Ireland
Italy (4) Sanpaolo IMI Sanpaolo IMI Sanpaolo IMI None None None
Unicredito Banca di Roma
The Netherlands (2) ING None ING ING ING ING
ABN Amro ABN Amro ABN Amro ABN Amro
Portugal (1) None None None B. Comercial Port. B. Comercial Port. B. Comercial Port.
Sweden (2) Svenska Handelsbanken None Svenska Handelsbanken None None None
United Kingdom (7) Abbey National Abbey National Abbey National HSBC HSBC HSBC
Bank of Scotland Bank of Scotland Bank of Scotland National Westminster B National Westminster  National Westminster
Barclays Barclays Barclays
HSBC HSBC HSBC
National Westminster Bank National Westminster Bank National Westminster Bank
Royal Bank of Scotland Royal Bank of Scotland Royal Bank of Scotland
Standard Chartered Standard Chartered
Log-differenced distance to default Abnormal returns
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In parenthesis: Number of banks on which bank exercises “strong” contagious influence. “Strong” is
defined as the upper 10 percent tail of 
*
/B A Ω . Only banks with contagious influence to at least three other
banks are reported.
Country
Positive tail Negative tail Both tails Positive tail Negative tail Both tails
Austria Creditanstalt (3)
Belgium KBC (10) KBC (4)
Germany HBV (11) Deutsche Bank (4) HBV (4) Deutsche Bank (16) BHF (3) BHF (3)
Deutsche Bank (15) IKB (6) Deutsche Bank (10) IKB (3) Commerzbank (6) Commerzbank (5)
Dresdner Bank (7) Dresdner Bank (4) Deutsche Bank (10) Deutsche Bank (14)
Dresdner Bank (4) Dresdner Bank (3)
IKB (10) IKB (5)
Denmark Jyske Bank (4) Jyske Bank (3) Danske Bank (11) Danske Bank (12) Danske Bank (12)
Jyske Bank (9) Jyske Bank (4)
Spain BBVA (3) Banco Pastor (3) Banco Pop. Espaniol (3) BBVA (5) BBVA (8) BBVA (9)
Banco Pop. Espaniol (3) Banco Pop. Espaniol (8) Banco Guipuzcoano (6) Banco Pastor (3) Banco Guipuzcoano (4)
Banco Santander (3) Banco Pop. Espaniol (5) Banco Santander (3) Banco Pastor (3)
Banco Zaragozano (3) Banco Santander (4) Banco Pop. Espaniol (3)
Banco Zaragozano (4) Banco Santander (3)
Finland Sampo Leonia (7)
France BNP Paribas (12) BNP Paribas (5) BNP Paribas (3)
Natexis (3)
Greece
Ireland Allied Irish Banks (6) Allied Irish Banks (22) Allied Irish Banks (20) Allied Irish Banks (14) Allied Irish Banks (5)
Anglo Irish Bank (3) Anglo Irish Bank (7) Anglo Irish Bank (9) Bank of Ireland (6)
Bank of Ireland (4) Bank of Ireland (18) Bank of Ireland (8)
Italy Banca Intesa (3) Banca di Roma (6) Banca Desio (3) Banca Agricola Mantovana (7Banca Agricola Mantovana (9Banca Agricola Mantovana (6
Banca di Roma (3) Rolo Banca (8) Rolo Banca (4) Banca Pop. Bergamo (7) Banca Lombarda (9) Banca Pop. Bergamo (9)
Banca Pop. Di Milano (6) Sanpaolo IMI (11) Sanpaolo IMI (12) Banca Pop. Com. E Indust. (4Banca Pop. Bergamo (10) Banca Pop. Com. E Indust. (4
Banca Desio (6) Unicredito (3) Banca Desio (6) Credito Valtellinese (17) Banca Desio (6)
Sanpaolo IMI (9) Credito Valtellinese (12) Banca Desio (5) Credito Valtellinese (16)
Unicredito (7) Unicredito (3) Sanpaolo IMI (3) Sanpaolo IMI (4)
The Netherlands ING (8) ING (4) ING (7) ABN Amro (3) ABN Amro (13) ABN Amro (7)
ING (20) ING (24) ING (26)
Portugal Banco Espirito Santo (7) BPI (4) Banco Com. Port. (16) Banco Com. Port. (10) Banco Com. Port. (12)
BPI (7) Banco Espirito Santo (10) Banco Espirito Santo (22) Banco Espirito Santo (16)
Sweden
United Kingdom Abbey National (23) Abbey National (21) Abbey National (31) National Westminster (3) HSBC (6)
Bank of Scotland (16) Bank of Scotland (7) Bank of Scotland (15) HSBC (14)
Barclays (9) Barclays (9) Barclays (11)
National Westminster (11) National Westminster (10) National Westminster (12)
HSBC (10) HSBC (8) HSBC (10)
Standard Chartered (5) Royal Bank of Scotland (7)
Royal Bank of Scotland (16)
Log-differenced distance to default Abnormal returns
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